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Abstract
Dissertation Title: “Towards a Competitive Setting for the Port of Aqaba in
the New Millennium”
Degree: MSc
This dissertation discusses the possible impact of the peace process in the
Middle East on the competitive setting of the port of Aqaba.  This process gave birth
to new rival ports especially on the Mediterranean, ports which in the medium and
the long term may pose a threat to the Port of Aqaba by taking a considerable part of
its cargo.  Therefore, this paper, includes an analysis of the significance of the Port to
the national economy being the country’s sole access to the sea.  Then, the
capabilities of rival ports and the changing competition and trade environment in the
region as a result of this process are analysed.  The spidergram was used as a tool to
carry out this analysis using the main elements that make up the competitiveness of
the port. As a result, the paper proposes some alternatives and measures that the Port
can take to maintain its market share and improve its competitiveness.  These
alternatives suggest taking advantage of the location and the infrastructure of the port
to attract transit traffic, containerised cargo, bulk cargo and cruise-ships.  Further, the
paper proposes carrying out necessary port reforms, giving the private sector an
opportunity to participate in port development and operations and opening channels
of dialogue with rival ports to investigate the possibility of having some kind of co-
operation between them and the Port of Aqaba.
 The paper concludes by proposing a marketing strategy for the Port based on
focus and differentiation approaches.  The strategy should be accompanied by
carrying out necessary reforms on both the operational and the administrative levels.
Key words:  Competition,  Planning,  Change, Marketing,  Differentiation,  Strategy,
        Alternatives, Focus, Process, Setting, Co-operation, Rivals, Reform.
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1Chapter One
    Introduction
Since Aqaba Port Authority was founded in 1952, the Port has established
itself as the main sea outlet of Jordan’s trade with the external world.   More than
75% of Jordan’s exports and imports pass through the Port.  However, the recent
political and economic changes in the Middle East resulting from the peace process,
along with the impacts of global economic and trade changes and technological
advances in the maritime industry, have created a highly competitive environment
and new trade practices in the region.
As a result, instead of being the main access for sea-born traffic into and out
of Jordan on the one hand, and for transit cargo for some neighbouring countries on
the other, the Port of Aqaba may soon find itself threatened by other ports on the
Mediterranean  like the ports of Ashdod and Haifa in Israel, the port of Beirut in
Lebanon and the ports of Tartus and Latakia in Syria.
 As far as transit traffic coming from the East is concerned, the Port of Aqaba
may also be threatened by the emerging pivotal role of the port of Dubai in the
United Arab Emirates which has established itself as a major transhipment and
distribution hub for various areas in the region and as a sea-air bridge to Europe.
Similarly, major Red Sea ports like the Saudi Arabia's Port of Jeddah, the Egyptian
ports of Port Said and the newly-erected North el Sukhnah port south of  Adabiya on
the western shore of the Red Sea and the new container terminals in Aden and
Salalah pose a real challenge to the attempts of the Port of Aqaba to attract an
additional share of the traffic as these ports are located on the entry and exit of the
2Suez Canal and on the main shipping route between Europe and South East Asia and
Japan.  Also, most of these ports are run and operated by either regional or global
port operators like the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA),  Dubai Port Authority
(DPA) and Maersk Sealand.
As far as Mediterranean ports are concerned, they are not only geographically
and logistically closer to the sources of production in Europe and North America but
are located at a stone’s throw from the consumption, commercial and industrial zones
in and adjacent to the capital Amman and  the northern part of the country.   Further,
these ports are located closer to the main trade partner of Jordan; Iraq with its  huge
market, particularly when the sanctions are lifted.  These ports are more likely to
have a comparative and competitive advantage over the Port of Aqaba as they
provide a shorter transit time to these areas in the medium and the long run when the
border-related and other trade barriers are removed.
This growing threat raises the risk of a serious and considerable loss of a
major part of what has been considered a traditional captive cargo of the Port of
Aqaba to these ports.  Further, this could create fierce competition which can hinder
the attempts of the Port of Aqaba to increase its market share, particularly transit
traffic, as this host of new terminals is likely to create an over-capacity in the region.
One has also to take into consideration that the emerging climate of peace and
stability in the region will not only contribute to boosting the economies of the
countries of the region but is also likely to generate transit traffic eastward through
Jordan from the Mediterranean ports.
Will the Port of Aqaba be able to  respond to this threat and how?  Does it
have sufficient resources for this?  What are the alternatives available?   Should it co-
operate with these ports or continue to work alone with the potential risk of losing its
own cargo or being  unable to gain more traffic?  Should  the port of Aqaba be
satisfied with handling its captive and traditional cargo or seek new trade horizons
and generate non-captive cargo and non-traditional activities like multi-modal
transport, logistics, value added services  like packaging, warehousing, etc?  And
3finally, can the Port of Aqaba act as an efficient gateway for the regional
manufacturing needs and services activities?
The answers to these questions along with suitable recommendations will be
the area of discussion for this dissertation which will look at these issues from two
angles. First, the potential impact on the local market imports and exports which are
traditionally handled via the Port of Aqaba.  Second, the potential impact on the
transit  traffic which formed a major part of the Port's traffic in the 1970s and 80s.
For this purpose, this dissertation will be organised into six chapters:
The first chapter is an introduction presenting a background to the topic and
reviewing the reasons for selecting it with a summary of the threats and challenges
that may face the Port of Aqaba as a result of the political and economic changes in
the region.
The second chapter will look into the role of the Port of Aqaba in the
economic and social development of Jordan.  In this connection, a background of the
Port, its function, facilities and relation with other sectors will be given.
The third chapter will review the economic and political changes in the
region, the peace process, forces of change and the implications of that change on the
Port.
The fourth chapter will evaluate the potential emerging competitive
environment in the region, the ports involved in that competition, the weaknesses and
strengths of each port and the competition implications.
The fifth chapter will be devoted to discussing the new commercial role of
the Port, developing alternatives and proposing a marketing strategy.
The last chapter will include the conclusions and recommendations.
The discussion and analysis in this paper will be based on the writer’s past
experience as a Marketing Manager at the Port of Aqaba, his meetings and contacts
with port users and clients, the data available about rival ports, relevant reference
books, articles, magazines, field trips and the lectures on port performance,
management and marketing in World Maritime University.
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2. The role of the Port of Aqaba in economic development in Jordan:
2.1  Background
The Port of Aqaba lies at the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba  which forms
the eastern arm of the Red Sea at latitude 29.5  31 degrees North and longitude 35 00
degrees East.  The Gulf extends 180 km from the city of Aqaba to the Straits of Tiran
which is a continuation of the great depression of the Rift Valley. The Port  is,
therefore, protected and surrounded by mountains from the east and the west and so
enjoys very favourable weather conditions.  Although it is located on the short
Jordanian coastline which is a narrow ribbon of about 26 km, Aqaba forms a
connection between Arab countries in Asia and those in North Africa and borders
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.  The Port has gained more and more importance
since its establishment in 1952 because it has been the main access to Jordan’s
exports and imports and a transit point for the demands of neighbouring  countries
like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf Co-operation Council States (GCC) as will be
shown later in this chapter.  This, of course, has been an advantage, however, it puts
different pressures on the port from time to time as considerable expansion projects
has to be implemented to satisfy the demands of these countries.  The Port is run by
The Ports Corporation (PC) which is a government body with financial independence
and reports to the Minister of Transport who is the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Port.  PC is entrusted with developing and operating the Port and
carrying out all cargo and ship-related functions.
52.2  Functions and facilities of the Port:
As the Port of Aqaba is Jordan’s only seaport, it has been functioning as the
country’s main access  for its exports of local mineral, agricultural and industrial
products on the one hand and for its imports of manufactured goods on the other.
The Port is  considered a strategic asset for the country and has accordingly received
great attention from the authorities at different levels.  The Port started with a small
quay for handling lighters and developed throughout the last five decades to become
a major port in the Red Sea region with the facilities and equipment shown below.
2.2.1  Handling equipment:
Table 2.1 below shows the cargo handling equipment in the Port.  This figure
and the ones following it will be used later for comparison purposes with other rival
ports.
Table 2.1
Cargo handling equipment in the Port of Aqaba
Equipment Capacity (ton) Number
Gantry Crane 40 2
Straddle Carrier 30 - 35 7
Super Stacker 40 - 50 2
Container Top Lifts 7 - 35 17
Mobile Cranes 90 - 120 2
Mobile Cranes 1 - 45 69
Forklifts 1.5 - 25 119
Tug-masters 60 - 70 25
Towing Tractors 20 - 25 46
Trailers 179
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
62.2.2  Storage facilities:
As far as storage is concerned, the Port has the following storage capacity:
Table 2.2
Storage capacity in the Port of Aqaba
Storage Area
Transit Sheds 62.000 sqm
Container Terminal 311.000 sqm
Covered Storage 41.000 sqm
Open Storage 245.000 sqm
Cold Storage 500 tons
Phosphate Storage 410.000 tons
Grain Silos 150.000 tons
Potash Storage 150.000 tons
Free Zone 19.000 sqm
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
2.2.3  Berthing facilities:
Berthing facilities in the Port are divided up into three parts; the main port,
the container port and the industrial port. The depth of water alongside quays ranges
from 6-25 meters. Table 2.3 below shows the berthing facilities of the main port
which are dedicated for handling general cargo, grain and the country's exports of its
major mineral product; phosphate rock.  However, for planning and tourism-related
considerations,  and due to the fact that a substantial proportion of general cargo
traffic is increasingly carried by containers, as will be seen later,  a feasibility study
is underway to  investigate the possibility of moving  phosphate rock exporting
facilities to the industrial zone on the southern coast and using this port for cruise-
ship traffic and other tourism-related activities.
7Table 2.3
Berthing facilities of the main port
Berth Depth/m Length/m
No. 1-6  G.C 11.2 - 13.4 1060
No. 7-9  G.C 5.8 - 8 450
No. 10 Tugboats 4.0 210
Phosphate A 11.0 210
Phosphate B 15.0 180
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
The other two parts of the Port are the container and the passenger port, and
the industrial port.  Berthing facilities in these ports are shown in  tables  2.4 and 2.5
respectively.
Table 2.4
                     Berthing facilities of the container port
Berth Depth /m Length /m
Container 1-3 15 - 20 540
Ro/Ro 12.0 40
Passenger, floating 15.0 150
Mo'ta, floating 15.0 150
Bulk Cement 11.0 120
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
Table 2.5
Berthing facilities of the industrial port
Berth Depth/m Length/m Draft/m Ship L/m Displacemnt
Industrial Seaward 15.0 200 15.0 230 70.000 ton
Industrial landward 11.0 190 11.0 190 40.000
Oil Jetty 25.0 140 24.0 370 406.000
Timber Berth 6.8 80.6 6.8 80(120) 14.000
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
8The above mentioned three port components are shown in the following
layout of the Port where number '1' points to the main port, '2' points to the container
and the passenger port, and number '3' points to the industrial port.
 Layout of the Port of Aqaba
92.3  The role of the Port in development:
The fact that the Port of Aqaba is Jordan’s only seaport shows the
considerable importance of this port to the country’s economic and social
development.  For almost half a century, the Port has been serving the country’s
economy in many ways both directly and indirectly.  The direct economic impact of
the port results from the port activities and cargo volumes handled through the port
which generate income, employment and other services directly associated with such
activities.  The indirect economic impact involves industries and businesses created
thanks to the Port in addition to the multiplier effect of the port on other economic
activities like banking, insurance, land transportation, etc. Graph 2.1 shows the
volumes of cargo handled via the Port since its establishment in 1952 up to 1998.
Graph 2.1
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
Development of Aqaba Port traffic from 
1952-1998 in '000 ton
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These economic and social impacts can be summarised in the following
aspects:
First, the port is a major employer of labour where the number of people
employed by the port (both permanent and casual) ranged from 4996 in 1990 to 5398
in 1998 as shown in the following table.
Table 2.6
Number of workers in Aqaba Port from 1990-1998
Year Number of workers
1998 5398
1997 5644
1996 5544
1995 5060
1994 5106
1993 5265
1992 5761
1991 5108
1990 4996
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
 Second, many economic activities, like shipping agents, road and rail
transport, forwarding agents, customs, security administrations and other relevant
services, depend in one way or another on the activities of the Port.  It is estimated
that each ton handled through the Port generates around $ 40 (Jordan, An Emerging
Market, Transport Sector, 1998 http://www.nic.gov.jo/economics/invest/308html,)
distributed among the different port-related activities mentioned above in addition to
the port authority itself.  According to this figure, the input of the Port in the national
economy was about $ 500m or 7.3% of the GDP in 1998.  However, one should bear
in mind that estimation of the exact overall impact of the Port on the economy
requires in-depth studies which is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper.
 Third, and most importantly, on the local level, around 80% of the total exports
of the country and 65% of the total imports are handled through the port.  On the
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regional level, the Port generated considerable economic benefits to the country
through its transit traffic which amounted to 35% - 40%  of the total traffic of the
Port during the 1970s and 1980s as will be seen in chapter three.
Fourth, the port is considered a growth centre as it encompasses a large
proportion of economic interests, a wide range of industries and regional and
international joint ventures like the agricultural, chemical and fertiliser industries.
Among these are joint ventures to produce fertilisers and agricultural products with
Japan, India and Norway.  In addition, the Arab Bridge Maritime Company, which
runs the ferry line between Jordan and Egypt, is one of the pioneer companies
contributing considerably to the Port income and the national economy.  Table 2.7
shows the ferry traffic between 1986-1998.
Table 2.7:
Passenger, vehicle & cargo via Aqaba-Nwebe´ferry line &cruise-ship taffic 86-98
Year Passengers Vehicles Cargo in tons Cruise-ships
1986 666132 28759 41577 10
1987 558688 35003 64638 9
1988 718490 45764 95619 6
1989 707777 54980 12980 16
1990 794355 72400 142820 21
1991 867374 65437 175621 1
1992 1204742 86562 226265 17
1993 1247167 86973 266596 30
1994 1349061 70513 302697 35
1995 1156134 5801 258015 62
1996 1074846 54048 231043 116
1997 828620 50964 269105 145
1998 733235 47721 268734 65
1999 705626 - - 95
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port statistics 1999
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Further, the Port is vital for the national trade and is likely to become a focus
point for maritime traffic, particularly, in view of the government’s recent decision to
transform Aqaba into a Special Economic Zone which is expected to generate more
cargo into and out of the country and increase value-added activities.
 Thus, we notice the pivotal role that the Port plays in the economic and social
development of the country.  Graph 2.2 shows a comparison between  the total cargo
handled ('000 tons) and the Port revenues ( '000 JDs)  from 1990 –1998.
Graph 2.2
  Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
2.4  Connection with other sectors:
As has been mentioned, the Port of Aqaba has a great impact on the country’s
economy either in terms of the number of people employed by the Port or with
relation to its multiplier effect and the activities connected to the Port either directly
or indirectly. These activities include:
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1.   Rail transportation represented by Aqaba Railway Corporation (ARC)
and the Hijaz Jordan Railway (HJR).   ARC, which is the major carrier of Jordan’s
main mining resource; phosphate, was formed in 1972 and has recently been
restructured and privatised with the aim of the construction of new railway
connections and expansions which are necessary for enhancing the transportation
capacity between the Port of Aqaba and the main cities and production centres within
the country and with other neighbouring countries.  This falls within a government
comprehensive plan to expand the national railways network and convert it into a
standard gauge to allow it to be linked to rail networks in other neighbouring
countries.  The plan involves the following projects:
-Amman Syrian border link
-Amman Iraqi border link
-Amman Aqaba link
-Shidya-Wadi links for the transportation of phosphate from the phosphate
mines in the southern region to the Port of Aqaba.
-Light rail system for the transport of passengers.
As regards the HJR, it is a holding company owned by the Government and
its establishment dates back to 1900 when it was built by the Ottoman Turks to
transport pilgrims to Saudi Arabia.  It starts from Damascus in Syria passing through
Amman and Ma’an in Jordan to Medina in Saudi Arabia.  However, the railway
suffered great damage during the 1st World War and its connection from the southern
Jordanian town of Ma’an to Medina has been out of operation since 1917.  At
present, part of the  railway is used for the transport of passengers and goods
between Amman and Damascus.  The Government is currently planning to expand
and upgrade HJR services through the construction of a light rail system linking
densely-populated areas in the centre and the north of the country.  This sector is
likely to play a major role in determining the competitive edge of the Port of Aqaba
either in terms of the overall transport cost or in terms of fast hinterland delivery,
multi-modal transport and transit traffic.  The following railway map shows the
existing rail connection and the proposed ones for the future.
14
2.   Land transportation represented by both private and semi-public
companies like, Iraqi-Jordanian Land Transport Co., Jordanian-Syrian Land
Transport Co., and the Unified Company for the Organisation of Land Transport.
This sector is also significant and is likely to have a considerable impact on the
15
competitive position of the Port of Aqaba in the short, medium and long term.
Although this sector is being restructured and provided with new trucks as a result of
the government’s policy to enhance the land transportation capacity, more
investments are needed to enable the sector to meet the anticipated transit and
internal transportation requirements.  Working in the same direction, the Government
has plans to develop the road network with the objective of improving the level of
services and facilitating road transport, particularly for the trucking industry and
services.
           3.  The maritime sector involves shipping and forwarding agents
represented by the Shipping Agents Association, the Forwarders Association, Jordan
National Shipping Lines Co. (JNSL), the Shipping Management and Chartering
Company, Arab Bridge Maritime Co. (ABMC) and other private companies involved
in different maritime-related activities.  JNSL is the national carrier and represents
the ship-owning activity along with other private sector activities.  The company
owns, operates and manages several multi-purpose ships.  There is a great potential
for developing this sector in many ways, including private sector involvement.  On
the other hand,  ABMC, which was formed in 1985 after the inauguration of the ferry
link between Jordan and Egypt and owned by Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, has played a
major role in generating traffic to the Port as about 250-300 thousand tons of cargo is
transported every year by its ferries in addition to around 0.7-1 million passengers as
shown in table 2.7.
    4. The industrialists, traders and shippers represented by the Chamber of
Commerce, the Chamber of Industry and Jordanian Exporters Association.
    5.  Air transport sector:  This sector plays a key role in the national economy.
There are three airports in the country; Queen Alia International Airport in Amman,
Amman Civil Airport, and Aqaba International Airport. These airports are controlled,
managed and operated by the Civil Aviation Authority.  In order to develop this
sector and prepare it to meet the anticipated growth in passenger and cargo traffic,
the Government is planning to commercialise the national air carrier; Royal
Jordanian Airlines, expand Amman Civil Airport and Aqaba International Airport
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with the possibility of using the latter as a joint Jordanian Israeli airport leading to
enhancing the competitive position of the Port of Aqaba in the medium and the long
run.
6.  The customs and health authorities in addition to other authorities involved in
cargo traffic into and out of the country.
These are the major sectors involved in maritime transport in Jordan.  The
quality and cost of their services is of paramount importance for enhancing the
competitive setting of the Port and recovering its role as a transit point.
2.5  Conclusion:
Thus, we see that the Port of Aqaba is vital for the economic and social
development of the country and any threat to its position is a threat to one of the
very basic structures of  the economy.  Furthermore, it is not only important that the
Port maintains its present share of traffic, but also it is necessary to increase that
share, develop and expand it to meet the anticipated growth of trade on both the
national and regional levels as a result of the changes brought about by the peace
process.  The following chapter will be dedicated to discussing these changes, their
impact and implications on the Port of Aqaba.
17
Chapter Three
3. The economic and political changes in the Middle East:
3.1  The peace process:
3.1.1   Background:
After more than five decades of hostilities and destructive wars, the Middle
East is presently embarking on vital political and, as a consequence, economic
changes promising an era of stability, prosperity and peace.  This hope was sparked
off  by the holding of the Middle East peace Conference in Madrid, Spain on the 30th
of October 1991.  This conference was looked at as the  beginning of an end to one
of the longest and bloodiest conflicts in history as it helped to reshape the basic
economic and political relationship between Israel and the Arab countries.  This
relationship began to take a new form, particularly after the signing of peace accords
between Israel and some Arab states including Jordan, a form of more understanding
and co-operation in some areas, and a form of competition in many others.  As the
peace process is achieving more progress, prospects of peace, prosperity and an
economic boom throughout the region are likely to be advancing and gaining ground.
As far as Jordan is concerned, various forms of co-operation in the fields of
economy, environment and transportation are increasingly taking place.  Signed in
October 1994, the peace accord between Jordan and Israel highlighted the necessity
and the desire to enhance the economic relations between the two countries in
general and in the maritime sector in particular.  This aim was more specifically
18
confirmed in the Agreement on Transportation between the two countries, signed on
the 21st of February 1995, which allowed for the free movement of cargo and vessels
between the ports of the two countries and  co-operation in shipping sectors,  “The
parties may mutually use each other’s ports for all services, including loading,
discharging, transit and passenger services, on an economical basis.” (Article IV, 1),
and “Cargo may be transferred from a port of one country to a port in the other
country for the purpose of transhipment.” (Article IV, 3), and “Israel will, in
accordance with its legislation, and upon request of the Jordanian Government, make
appropriate arrangements for the leasing to Jordan of hinterland areas in
Mediterranean ports for off-dock activities for Jordanian cargo.  Jordan, will, in
accordance with its legislation, enable equivalent off-dock activities for Israeli cargo
in the Port of Aqaba.” (Article IV, 4).  These provisions may pave the way for having
co-operation agreements between the ports of the two countries which is one of the
potential solutions to overcome the anticipated fierce competition.  This point will be
discussed in more depth later.
Also, the Agreement permitted transit transportation between the two
countries, “The transport of freight by trucks on land between the two countries and
in transit to  a third country will be permitted on the basis of the ‘back-to-back’
system, …” (Article II, D, 1).  This article was reviewed later where more
freedom was given to the movement of trucks between the two countries.
This new spirit of political reconciliation  will not necessarily be the same as
in the economic arena although it may help to open new horizons of co-operation in
the ports sector between the two countries.  We may rather witness various forms of
competition between the ports of the two countries in particular and with other ports
in the region in general.
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3.2 Impact on the Port of Aqaba:
Although the Port of Aqaba has been the main sea access to Jordan’s exports
and imports, it has played a major role as a transit point for other neighbouring
countries particularly Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s where the transit traffic amounted
to 35 - 40% of the total annual traffic of the Port as shown in graph 3.1 below.
Graph 3.1
         Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
The volumes and destinations of such traffic as shown in table 3.1 below,
reveal the vast transit hinterland of the Port although with small volumes except for
Iraq.  This gives an indication of the traffic potential and the competitive advantage
that the Port enjoys in this field.
Total traffic vis. a. vis incoming transit traffic from 83-98 in 
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Table 3.1
Incoming transit cargo to various countries from 1983-1998 in 000 tons
Ir
aq
Syri
a
Saudi
Arabia
Leb
an
Kuwa
it
Yem
en
U.A.E Other
s
Total
83 2869 .138 51 4 6 .011 7 .040 2917
84 3182 .007 24 .918 9 .147 4 .300 3220
85 3969 000 24 .428 7 000 4 3 4007
86 4434 .192 13 .452 7 000 6 10 4470
87 5882 .272 34 .025 14 .118 6 5 5941
88 6853 .260 32 .009 19 1 11 13 6929
89 6087 .035 35 .232 20 2 8 11 6163
90 3154 1 42 1 15 1 9 6 3229
91 1440 .287 49 4 14 .203 10 9 1526
92 1959 2 78 5 30 3 13 4 2094
93 1088 2 117 2 36 2 17 10 1274
94 194 1 136 6 32 .455 16 1 386
95 513 .516 84 3 29 .041 29 13 671
96 278 .884 134 5 33 10 26 19 506
97 593 .423 179 5 26 8 48 29 888
98 510 .001 93 3 26 1 30 19 682
Source: Aqaba Port statistics, 1998
The transit traffic was not restricted to incoming cargo but there has been a
considerable amount of outgoing cargo as shown in table 3.2.
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Table 3.2
Outgoing & incoming transit cargo and total traffic between 1988-1998 in 000 tons
Year Outgoing cargo Incoming cargo Total traffic
1988 2919 6929 9848
1989 1151 6163 7314
1990 349 3229 3578
1991 37 1526 1563
1992 39 2094 2133
1993 28 1274 1302
1994 41 386 427
1995 46 671 717
1996 47 506 553
1997 77 888 965
1998 65 682 747
Source: Aqaba Port statistics, 1998
This transit traffic, which the Port of Aqaba is struggling to recover, as well
as other traffic, especially the western traffic1, are threatened to be lost to both the
Mediterranean ports and the Arabian Gulf ports, particularly Haifa and Dubai.  The
role of the Port of Aqaba as a transit point has also put tremendous pressures on it
from time to time and has been affected in different ways by the political
developments in the region starting from the first closure of the Suez Canal in 1956,
followed by the second in 1967 following the 1967 Arab Israeli war, then the
reopening of the Canal  in 1976 after its  closure in 1973 in the aftermath of the 1973
Arab-Israeli war, the civil war in Lebanon which started in the mid 1970s, the Iraq-
Iran war from 1981 to 1988 and finally the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the
                                                          
1 Traffic originating from or going to Europe, North and South America, North and West Africa, East
Europe and Russia will be referred to in this paper as western traffic or Med./Suez route, while traffic
originating from or going to South and East Asia, Japan, Australia and India will be referred to as
eastern traffic or Red Sea route.
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United Nations sanctions that followed.  These events left their mark on traffic via
the Port of Aqaba in different ways.  While the civil war in Lebanon and the Iran Iraq
war created a cargo traffic boom through the port, the closure of the Suez Canal and
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait affected cargo traffic badly.  These impacts can clearly
be seen in graph 3.2 which shows the variation of traffic via the Port from 1955 to
1999.
Graph 3.2
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1999
Thus, we notice the fluctuation of traffic as a result of the political events in
the region since 1955 particularly during the years 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1990.
Similarly, the peace process is likely to have an impact on the Port in
different forms as it has coincided with the wide range of economic changes in the
world and the emergence of the world economic and liberal policies sponsored by
WTO agreements.  The result is that, in the medium and the long run, national
governments, including Jordan2, will not be able to favour protectionism policies.
On the contrary, these policies are likely to be abolished while free trade and
unrestricted movement of cargo will be promoted.  Thus, the Port of Aqaba, might be
                                                          
2 Jordan has recently joined WTO and introduced several laws and policies for free market
competition.
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threatened by new players in the region, both on the Mediterranean and the Red Sea
and the Arabian Gulf.  These ports pose a real threat to the Port of Aqaba in two
areas.
First, the Port's captive traffic of local imports coming from the European and
North American markets, and non-mining exports going to these markets.
 Second, the Port's transit traffic.  The ports in question are the Port of Haifa
and the Port of Ashdod in Israel, the port of Beirut in Lebanon and the port of
Latakia in Syria.  In addition, there is another  potential threat coming from the East,
that is the Port of Dubai with its large capabilities and world-wide reputation of
container handling, transhipment and sea-air traffic from the Arabian Gulf to Europe.
This port is preparing to enter the Iraqi market for the cargo coming from the Far
East once the sanctions are lifted.  In addition to the port of Dubai, there are the
newly-established container terminals in Salalah in Oman, Aden in Yemen, Jeddah in
Saudi Arabia and North el Sukhnah in Egypt. As far as Mediterranean ports are
concerned, they are geographically closer to two major production centres in the
world; Europe and North America.  They are also located close to the north and the
centre of  Jordan where approximately 61% of the population live and most of the
main industrial, commercial and financial activities are centred.  Further, these ports
are closer to the Iraqi market in comparison with the Port of Aqaba which means that
they can provide a shorter transit time and less costly access to the Iraqi market in the
long run when a comprehensive  peace is  reached and border barriers are removed.
The following map of the Middle East shows the location of both the
Mediterranean ports and the Arabian Gulf ports in relation to the hinterland in
Jordan, Iraq and other neighbouring countries.
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On the other hand, having a quick look at the composition and geographical
distribution of Jordanian imports of major commodities like foodstuffs, machinery,
manufactured goods and transport equipment as shown in the tables below, we notice
that their main sources are the United States (U.S.A), European Community (EC)
countries and Japan.  In terms of the number of TEUs, for example, imports from the
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U.S.A and the EC countries accounted for 55.6% of the total number of incoming
containers which reached 87 533 TEUs in 1998.  In tonnage terms, 67% of the total
imported cargo in 1998, which reached 5 333 727 million tons, was western traffic
while the remaining 33% was eastern traffic. At the same time, about 20% of
Jordanian exports via the Port of Aqaba, which reached  7.310 million in 1998,  went
to the west; Europe, North America, North Africa, East Europe, Russia and Central
and South America as we will see later in this chapter.   This shows the big amount
of traffic of the Port, other than transit traffic, that is threatened to be lost to the
Mediterranean ports in the medium and the long term.  With regard to the transit
traffic, it is likely also, that a considerable proportion of it will be shifted not only to
these ports but also to the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf ports. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show
the total Jordanian imports in TEUs and weight in tons from 1995 – 1998 from Far
East and South East countries on the one hand, and from U.S.A and E.U countries on
the other.
Table 3.3
Number & weight (ton) of containers imported via Red Sea route from
95-98, '000 tons / TEUs
Country of
origin
1995
 WT    TEU
1996
 WT      TEU
1997
 WT      TEU
1998
 WT       TEU
Growth
rate 95/98
Far  East 168      18 184       21 210      22 283       31 69%
S. West Asia 42         4 40          4 47         4 36        3 -15%
Aust.&Newz  5        0.4 7        0.52 6        0.48 11      0.87 147%
GCC States 19        2 40          4 44        4 29         3 55%
E& S. Africa 9        0.7 7         0.48   9       0.67 19        1 106%
Total 243     25 278        30 316      32 378     39 56%
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
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Table 3.4
Number & weight (ton) of containers imported via 95-98 Med.- Suez Canal
route in '000 tons / TEUs
Country of
origin
1995
WT     TEU
1996
 WT     TEU
1997
 WT      TEU
1998
WT       TEU
Growth
rate 95/98
W. Europe 299       27 388      35 384      34 444         39 48%
E.Euro &Com. 5         0.4 2        0.19 4          0.4 2          0.24 -575
East Med. 2          0.2 6         0.5 15          1 13          1 731%
USA& Canada 29           3 36          4 48          5 58          6 100%
South America 4         0.25 3          0.2   7         0.45 13         1.1 235%
N.&W. Africa 3         0.25 9         0.73 9         0.7 6         0.47 102%
Others 2         0.16 3         0.27 000      000 000        000 -100%
Total 344        31 445      41 467       42 536       49 56%
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
The total tonnage and number of containers imported via both routes during
the same period are shown in table 3.5 below.
Table 3.5
Total tonnage & TEUs imported via Red Sea and Med. Routes from 95-98
Year Weight in '000 tons '000 TEUs
1995 586 55
1996 724 70
1997 783 73
1998 914 87
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
These figures show very clearly that the number of containers imported via
the Mediterranean route is higher than that via the Red Sea route.  For example,
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55.6% of the total number of containers imported to the Port came through the Med.-
Suez Canal route against 44.4% via the Red Sea route in 1998.
The above figures and the proportion for each route are shown in  graph 3.3.
Graph 3.3
Comparison of containerised cargo imported via Red Sea & Med. Routes 95-98
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
In addition to what has been mentioned above, a quick glance at the
commodities imported from the USA and Europe (Appendix C) gives a clear
indication of the beginning of a shift of western cargo imports from the Port of
Aqaba to Mediterranean ports.  From this appendix, we notice the following:
1. 67% of Jordan's imports is western traffic.
2. As of 1994, the year in which the peace accord between Jordan and Israel was
signed, imports of general cargo, rice, flour, sugar, mineral oils and vegetable
oils have either been declining or fluctuating contrary to other commodities
like grains, steel, ammonia  and cars which have to go to Aqaba Port at this
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stage because they are either imported in big quantities or are needed for the
industries located in Aqaba area. (appendix C).  Graph 5.4 shows this trend.
Graph 3.4
Commodities imported from Europe & USA from 1994-1998 in '000 tons
       Source: Aqaba Port Statistics 1998
Although the imports are the part of traffic that is more likely to be lost to
Mediterranean ports as a result of the economic and political changes in the region,
exports, other than mineral and bulk products, may be also affected as a considerable
part of them go to Europe and North America (Appendix A).  Table 3.6 shows the
total exports via the Port of Aqaba during the period between 1994 and 1998 and
their distribution  among different commodities.
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Table 3.6
Cargo exported via Aqaba port from 1994-1998 in '000 tons
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Growth
rate 94/98
Phosphate 3825 3878 4350 4367 3729 -2.5%
Chem.Fert. 518 637 674 724 1068 106%
General C. 108 151 188 182 389 260%
Re-exports 33 31 38 57 46 39%
Trans-ship. 1 8 72 92 16 150%
Transit 41 46 47 77 64 56%
Empty Cont. 105 97 113 125 157 49.5%
Potash 1501 1722 1698 1447 1508 0.47%
Cement 516 109 216 464 333 -35%
Total 6648 6679 7396 7535 7310 10%
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics 1998
Again, in order to estimate the proportion of exported traffic via the Port of
Aqaba that goes to the West through the Suez Canal-Mediterranean route in
comparison with that which goes to the East through the Red Sea route, volumes and
types of cargo exported to these two blocks via the Port  in 1998 were monitored and
the result was found to be as shown in tables 3.7 and 3.8 respectively.  The year 1998
will be taken as a basis for analysis and as an indicator for the future trend.
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Table 3.7
Exports via the Red Sea route to the East in 1998 in 000´tons
Region Total Traffic Main commodities
Far East 2007 Phosphate,Fertilizers, Potash, Empty cont.
South West Asia 2583 Phosphate, Fertilizers, Potash, G.C
Australia&Newzeland 540 Phosphate, Potash
G.C.C States 199 Cement, G.C, Re-xports, Emp.Cont.
East Africa 416 Fertilizers,Potash, cement, Gen. Cargo
Total 5745
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics 1998
Table 3.8
Exports via Suez Canal-Med. route to the West in 1998 in 000’tons
Region Total Traffic Main Commodities
West Europe 919 Phosphate, Potash, G.C, Empty cont.
U.S.A & Canada 33 Gen. Cargo, Re-exports
East Europe & Comm. 158 Phosphate, Potash, G.C
N. & W. Africa 280 Potash, Cement, G.C, Transhipment
East Med. 61 Gen. Cargo, Re-exports, Empty cont.
South America 15 Potash
Total 1466
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
Thus, we notice that exports through the Suez Canal / Mediterranean route
form 20.9% of the total exports while exports via the Red Sea route form 79.1%.  It
is noticeable also that general cargo is the predominant traffic among exports via the
Med./Suez route after phosphate and potash and it forms about 9.2% of the total
exports going to the west, a cargo which is more likely to be containerised in the
future.  Also, although the main exports of Jordan are mineral and bulk commodities,
the volumes of general cargo exports have been  increasing since 1992 where they
formed 5.3% of the total exports in 1998 as shown in table 3.9.
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Table 3.9
Total exports vis a vis General Cargo exports from 1992-1998 in 000’tons
Year Total Exports General Cargo Percentage
1992 7362 139 1.9%
1993 6381 102 1.6%
1994 6648 108 1.6%
1995 6679 151 2.2%
1996 7396 189 2.5%
1997 7535 182 2.5%
1998 7310 389 5.3%
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
Graph 3.5 shows the growth of G.C exports compared with  total exports from 92-98.
       Graph 3.5
         Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
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The significance of this growth in general cargo exports springs from the fact
that these exports are mainly manufactured materials produced in the industrial
centres in the capital Amman, Zerqa and Irbid in the north of the country which are
closer to the Mediterranean ports and where the hinterlands of the Port of Aqaba,
Beirut Port and the Israeli ports overlap as shown in the following map.
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What has been said about local trade can also be said about transit trade to
Iraq and other surrounding countries as these ports provide a lower cost and a shorter
transit access to west-bound trade and vice versa.
3.3  Forces of change:
Perhaps one of the greatest changes that has taken place in recent years is that
the world is heading towards more stability, more co-operation, more globalisation
and more inclination towards information technology use.  The Middle East is, of
course, not far from these changes.  The result of these new developments is that
competition is increasingly becoming more fierce as trade barriers are being removed
either through liberal policies or by World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements.
Change is taking place rapidly and the future is no longer the next generation or even
the next decade.  It is, rather, the next few years.  These changes will certainly have
an impact on all products including port services where standards like quality, low
cost and reliability will be on top of many increasingly additional sophisticated
customer requirements.  In this new highly competitive environment, the ability to
compete is greatly dependent on the ability to adapt oneself to the changes created by
the new developments regionally and globally.  In this respect, it is worth discussing
the forces of change that are likely to have a considerable impact on the direction and
ability of most economic activities, including ports, to compete. (M. Gerhardt,
Intermodal Freight Transportation. p.2).  These forces of change are:
-  Globalisation
-  New and emerging technologies
-  Regulation and deregulation
3.3.1  Globalisation:
Trends towards globalisation have dramatically changed the face and shape
of world business and economy.  As a result, the world’s people and economies are
becoming more interdependent where borders are disappearing, protectionism laws
are shrinking and a new global economic community is being created.  Further,
business and economic interests are going beyond country or even regional-based
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thinking.  What we are likely to witness in the near future is much more globally
integrated economies and businesses.  These fundamental changes are putting
tremendous pressures on the maritime sector in general and on the port sector in
particular from various aspects.  First, in terms of competitive pressures and low
profitability services, and, second, in terms of changing customer requirements and
services offered by ocean carriers.  These services have different shapes and new
dimensions where a supply chain is offered rather than a single product or service;
pure sea transportation.  This trend will have a great impact on ports because it will
make them part of the hinterland service chain (land and rail transportation).
However, these changes may, at the same time, create opportunities for ports of the
region as the Middle East can not be isolated from the outside world.  The present
and the anticipated economic boom in the Far East is a good example of these
opportunities which the Port of Aqaba should take advantage of benefiting from its
location as far as trade with these countries is concerned in comparison with other
rival ports. Thus, due to its location and abundant natural resources, the Middle East
will be in the heart of these changes.  Those who are going to survive in this highly
competitive environment are the most efficient, the best equipped, the fastest to
respond to these changes and, of course, the  best marketed.
3.3.2  New and emerging technologies:
Breakthroughs in technology, communications and transportation are the
main features of today’s economic equation .  The new technological developments
such as the internet, electronic data interchange (EDI) and other information systems,
the container, fast and large ships and sophisticated cargo handling equipment pose a
big and real challenge to today’s ports.  Ports which can best use, own, harness and
efficiently cope with these technologies will surely have a better chance.  These
changes can make or break any business and any delay or failure to keep up with
them means a lost opportunity and the failure to remain competitive.
3.3.3  Regulation and deregulation:
This element has to do with the extent of government intervention in
economic activities and its policies which can either be constructive or destructive.
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Today, more open and liberal policies are needed and all constraints and unnecessary
regulatory policies have to be removed if a full advantage of opportunities offered by
the market is to be taken.  However, this new spirit should not be understood as a
way to affect, avoid or bypass the right of each state to regulate and control its
economic activities within the framework of the emerging spirit of change where
isolation and protectionism are increasingly diminishing.
3.4   Change implications:
Perhaps, the greatest impact  resulting from the above change trend is that
trade in the region, as well as in the world,  is nowadays driven by profit, markets
and competition.  Moreover, and most importantly, the development of these forces
of change outpaces the capabilities of most  small ports like the Port of Aqaba.  So,
the Port is likely to suffer unless it is able to adapt to the winds of change through
providing higher quality and fast and cost-effective service. This goal can not be
achieved unless the growing gap of technological advances and opportunities is
narrowed or entirely removed through acquiring technology, having access to new
developments and information technologies like the internet.
Also, the emergence of global carriers, global port operators, global multi-
modal operators accompanied with the introduction of the latest ships in terms of
size, lower cost and speed, alternative transportation modes and sophisticated
handling equipment have put a heavy burden on the  Port of Aqaba.  In order to cope
with these changes, the Port  faces a big challenge; the challenge of acquiring these
technologies, the challenge of  dealing with these big players and the challenge of
finding a place in this world-wide network of regional and global operators.  These
large operators are now putting great pressure on ports of the region, including the
Port of Aqaba, as they are increasingly having or threatening to have their own
terminals right next to the local terminals.  In addition, they hold in their hands the
three most important advantages necessary for the success of any port; technology,
traffic and efficiency.  The examples are clear: PSA in Aden, Maersk Sealand in
Salalah and Port Said, DPA in Jeddah and Beirut and many more to come.  It is true
that investments in information technology, purchasing new equipment,  short,
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medium and long term planning and training programmes are badly needed.   It is
true also that the Port of Aqaba has to take the new changes  into consideration and
best-benefit from its own capabilities and  advantages like the location, the
infrastructure, the skilled and cheap labour force and the surrounding markets,
although these advantages are changing and enjoyed by other competitors.
However, that may not be the best answer and the most appropriate response to these
challenges unless a long term commercial strategy is set up taking into account the
far-reaching effects of these changes, on top of which is the question of whether you
can survive if you are not part of the 'production line' or the global network of these
big players and whether you are able to respond to their fast and constantly changing
requirements.
In light of this, in order to survive, should the Port of Aqaba diversify its
services?  Can it grow larger or get involved in the regional network or the global
supply chain?  Can it remain small and work as a niche or a feeder port?  Should the
door be opened for private sector participation in operation?  These issues will be
tackled in more detail in chapter five when a new development and marketing
strategy for the Port is discussed.   However, the next chapter will be dedicated to
discussing the capabilities of rival ports and looking at  the elements which make
ports competitive.
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Chapter Four
4. The emerging competitive environment:
4.1 The new players:
The new political climate in the Middle East has triggered off new
economic and trade practices in the region in general and in Jordan in particular
where exports and imports are being transported through different accesses and by
different modes.  Following the signing of the peace accord with Israel, Jordanian
exporters and importers are more and more yielding to the temptation of using the
Israeli ports located on the Mediterranean for their trade to and from Europe and
North America.  Similarly, these exporters and importers are looking to the
Lebanese and Syrian ports for the same purpose and even to the new Gaza port in
the long run.  The Israeli ports are the ports of Haifa and Ashdod while the main
Lebanese and Syrian ports are mainly the ports of Beirut and Latakia respectively.
If trade barriers, whether political or regulative, are removed, these ports can
provide a direct and short access to and from the European and North American
markets for trade originating from or heading for both Jordan and the neighbouring
countries.
Unfortunately, the Port's transit traffic is also threatened from the east and
the south by the new and emerging hub ports in the Red Sea region like the ports of
Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, North El Sukhnah south of the Suez Canal and Dubai in the
Arabian Gulf.  These ports have already either established themselves as
distribution and hub ports for the region like the port of Dubai or are in their way to
do that like Jeddah and North El Sukhnah, Salalah and Aden  ports.  Prior to
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drawing a comparison between the Port of Aqaba and the rival ports, a brief review
of these ports and other regional ports that may have an impact on the port industry
in the region will be given in the following few pages.
4.1.1  Haifa Port:
Located 120km north of Tel Aviv, Haifa Port is considered the oldest and the
largest port in Israel.  It was built by the British and started operations in 1933.  The
port is protected by two main breakwaters and has a total quay area of 6417m,
4932m of which form the main port and  1485m form the Kishon zone.  The port has
berths for handling general cargo, containers, roll on / roll off cargo and grain.  It is
divided up into two parts; the East Quay and the West Quay.  The East Quay is
1000m long with 14m water depth, 780m of which are dedicated for handling
containers and 220m for handling bulk cargo.  This part has a storage capacity of
15000 TEUs and 900 electrical points for reefer containers.  The West Quay has a
quay area length of 400m with a depth of 10.5m and has a storage area for 700
TEUs.  In 1996, the port handled 13.5 million tons of cargo excluding oil and
427.000 passengers.  In order to develop the port's capacity, meet the projected
growth of cargo and establish a modern overland transport network, Haifa port has
set a  $ 1 billion-programme for the port's 2000-2004 development plan.  Currently, a
US$ 224m programme is being implemented to double the berthing capacity and to
increase the handling capacity to 900.000 TEUs per year.  Due to its location, Haifa
Port can provide short transit services to the north and centre of Jordan and other
surrounding countries like Iraq.
A quick look at the development plan of the port shows that it focuses on the
development of the container handling capacity and the overland road and rail
transport in order to be able to face the anticipated growth in container traffic in the
future.  The container traffic in the port has developed rapidly during the last decade
as shown in graph 4.1 below, and with the port 2000 plan development, it is
anticipated that this capacity will be doubled.
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Graph 4.1
Source: Derived from Haifa Port Web Site 1999
As far as the container handling equipment is concerned,  Haifa Port has the
following:
Table 4.1
Container handling equipment in Haifa Port
Type Capacity in tons Number
Gantry crane 35 8
Transtainer 35 15
Portable 5-35 17
Source: Derived from Haifa Port Web site
The implications of the development of these facilities and equipment will be
the area of discussion later in this chapter.
4.1.2 Ashdod Port:
Located 40km south of Tel Aviv and considered the second largest port in
Israel.  It started operation in 1965.  It is  protected by two breakwaters and has 4000
meters of quays with a maximum water depth of 14m.  The berthing facilities and
handling equipment of the port are as follows:
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Table 4.2
Berthing facilities and handling equipment in Ashdod Port
Berth Length/m Depth/m Crane No.
G.C, liquids, RoRo 770 5.10.5 8 - 25 ton 10
G.C 150 5 - -
G.C & bulk 620 5-11.5 25-50 ton 9
Passenger & G.C 207 12.5-13 8 ton 3
G.C, bulk, RoRo 477 7-13.8 32-35 ton 6
RoRo 150 7 - -
Containers & RoRo 481 10-12 35/70 5
Coal & containers 435 13.8 40 2
Phosphate & potash 400 12-14 - -
Liquid bulk 150 7 - -
Source: Derived from Ashdod Port Web site
As regards the throughput of the port, it was as follows during the period
between 1990 - 1998.
Graph 4.2
              Source:  Derived from Ashdod Port Web site 1999
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With regard to the development plan, Ashdod port has set a master plan
to develop the port with three components:
1. Breakwaters
2. Quay layout and their uses
3. Development of operational areas
The plan, which is called Ashdod North, will take place in two stages.  The
first stage, Ashdod North A, and the second stage, Ashdod North B.  The plan
includes building an additional 3.850 meters of quayside which is equal to the
present quay lengths of the port, 325 acres of operational areas (the present
operational areas consist of 238 acres), 2150m of breakwaters (the present length of
breakwaters is 3100m) and building a new container terminal.  Ashdod North A is
scheduled to be completed in 2002 and includes building 1150m of breakwaters, new
general cargo and container quays with a length of 1900m and an operational area of
212 acres.  The implementation of Ashdod North B plan will depend on future
demand.  The total cost of this development plan is estimated at $500 million for
stage A and $400 million for stage B.
4.1.3  Beirut Port:
Lebanon's primary port, located between Nahr Beirut and Ras Beirut.  The
port played a major role during the early 70s as a transit point for cargo traffic to and
from most of the surrounding countries including Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf.
Due to the damage that the port suffered during the civil war in Lebanon, the port has
recently witnessed a large expansion and rehabilitation programme focussing on
container berthing and handling facilities.  Quay number 15 with a length of 280m
has been completed, and work is currently underway to build quay 16.  On
completion of this berth, the port will have 1000 meters of quay wall with a water
depth of 15m capable of  accommodating 3 - 4 vessels at the same time and will be
equipped with 4 post-panamax gantry cranes.  This terminal, which will be operated
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by Dubai Port Authority, is expected to add a further 400.00 TEUs to the port's
capacity by 2001 noting that the Port handled 157070 TEUs in 1998.   Another
breakwater will be built.
Currently, the port area covers 61 hectares protected by a 2255m breakwater
and has  14 berths for handling  general cargo, bulk coal and break bulk distributed
over four docks.
The port has also three mooring buoys for vessels handling cargo into lighters
and one for tankers located 2.4km from the port's entrance where cargo is discharged
through an underwater pipeline.
With regard to the storage capacity, the port has 75.000 square meters of
covered storage, 120.000 sq. m of open storage and 90.000 sq. m of container
stacking areas.
Finally, the port has a free zone area of 104.100 sq. m
4.1.4.  Dubai Port:   
 One of the leading distribution and transhipment ports not only in the Middle
East but also in the world.  In 1997, it was ranked 10th among the container ports in
the world as it handled 2.6 million TEUs in that year, while in 1999 the port handled
2.336.787 million TEUs and a total cargo of 32.409.991 million tons.  The port is
well-established,  well-equipped and has the advantage of the existence of  Jebel Ali
Free Zone which is one of the largest free zones in the world.  The port uses
advanced computer technology in its operations including a container terminal
management system (CTMS),  global container positioning system (GPS), container
freight station (CFS) and a manifest and documentation system (MDS).
The port has the following container handling equipment (1998
statistics) as shown in table 4.3.
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Table 4.3
Container handling equipment and reefer points  in Dubai Port
Container cranes panamax 15
Container cranes post panamax 10
RTGs 34
Straddle carriers 27
Forklifts 117
Empty container handlers 24
Top loaders 14
Trailers 274
Terminal tractors 152
Mobile harbour cranes (up to 120t) 2
Reefer points 950
Source: Derived from DPA Web site 1999
Due to its location, free trade policies, the existence of Jebel Ali Free Zone
and the large and rich hinterland surrounding the area, Dubai Ports Authority has
managed to attract a large number of  shipping lines and  cargo operations not only to
the Arabian Gulf area but also to most Middle Eastern countries.  The port has also
established, for the first time, sea-air traffic to and from Europe and the Far East.  In
order to have a footstep on the Mediterranean, Dubai Ports Authority (DPA)
managed, in 1998, to gain a management contract to operate Beirut Container
Terminals.  DPA managed also to win a 20-year concession contract to run the
southern container terminal in Jeddah Port.  The port has a ten-year investment plan
with the aim of reaching  a throughput of  3m TEUs in 2000 and 3.7m TEUs in 2005.
4.1.5  Jeddah Islamic Port:   
 This is the main hub port for Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea and  the major
access to  Saudi Arabia's imports and exports to and from Europe and USA.  Until
1996/97, the port was suffering from poor performance and low productivity.
However, the Saudi Authorities took a number of measures to correct the situation
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through private management contracts and concession arrangements.  The new North
Terminal was developed by converting bulk and general cargo berths into a container
terminal which became operational early this year.  This terminal project includes
building a 1000m quay, dredging operations to allow vessels up to 14.5m draft to
berth and acquiring three post-panamax gantry cranes and seven RTGs in the first
stage.  The operator will be required to purchase another four post-panamax gantry
cranes and five RTGs.  On the other hand, the operation of the South Terminal was
awarded to a different private operator who is a joint venture between Dubai Ports
Authority and Saudi Maintenance Corporation in order to create a competitive
environment in the port.  This terminal will have 1.680m quayside length and be
equipped with eleven gantry cranes, three of which will be super post-panamax.
Graph   4.3  shows the container throughput of Jeddah Port in 1986  and from 1990
to 1998 in ‘000 TEUs.
Graph 4.3
Source:  Derived from World Container Port, Markets to 2010,
Ocean Shipping  Consultants Ltd.
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4.1.6  Mina Raysut - Salalah:
A new hub, opened in 1998, owned and operated on a concession basis
grouping Salalah Port Services with a 20% share, private investors with a 50% share,
and most importantly Maersk Sealand with 30%.  The hub has four berths with a
total length of 1.236m and a water depth of 15m and is equipped with twelve super
post-panamax gantry cranes, six of which have an outreach of 22 cell widths
designed to handle the next generation of container ships of 10.000 TEUs.  The
future plan of this project envisages building 24 berths.  This port will serve as a
major transhipment centre for the whole region with feeder destinations to all Middle
Eastern countries, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Subcontinent.  To the surprise of
the port operators, this relatively new hub handled 666.000 TEUs in 1999, 40% more
than the projected figure.
4.1.7 North el Sukhnah:
A new port being built 40 km south of the southern entrance of the Suez
Canal south of Adabiya.  The port will be constructed in four phases where four
basins will be built.  The first basin with a total cost of $ 200 million is expected to
be completed by September 2000 and will have a quay length of 1500m for handling
containers and bulk cargo.  This project is a joint venture grouping local Egyptian
companies and the Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) which has a 25% share.
The project plans to have a capacity of 1.5 million TEUs  per year to be increased to
5 million TEUs by year 2020.
4.1.8 Port Said Port
Lies on the northern entrance of Suez Canal and, due to its location, it has
become the biggest transit port in the world.  It has also become a target for many
major shipping lines planning to build their transhipment terminals in it like P & O
and Maersk-Sealand for traffic to the East Mediterranean  and Black Sea regions.
4.1.9 Aden Port:
Due to its location, Aden Port was one of the busiest ports until the late 1960s
when it was severely affected by the civil war.  However, in March 1999, the Aden
Container Terminal (ACT) was opened and will be run by PSA Corp. under a 20-
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year contract.   At present, the port has a 700-hundred meter quay with a depth of
16m equipped with four super post-panamax container gantry cranes.  The next
expansion phase of the port includes the deepening of the quayside draft to 18
meters, extension of the terminal to 1700m and purchasing 12 container gantry
cranes. The plan also comprises the establishment of a free trade zone and an
industrial area.  ACT managed to handle 80.000 TEUs in the first nine months of its
operation and is projected to hit 300.000 TEUs in 2000.
4.2  The potential challenge:
Having a quick glance at the capabilities and development plans of the above
ports whether on the Mediterranean or on the Red Sea, the following is noticed:
 1.  All of the ports are trying to upgrade their berthing and handling capacity
through building new terminals and purchasing new equipment.  For this purpose
large investments have been made in co-operation with foreign investors.
             2.  New ports  have been built or are being built especially in the Red Sea
region, opening the door wide for fierce competition and a potential over-capacity.
             3.  All port investments and expansions are focussing on container traffic.
This is apparently in response to the anticipated growth in containerised traffic at the
expense of breakbulk traffic.  This trend has been shown in a recent demand forecast
done by Ocean  Shipping Consultants Ltd which anticipates a rise in demand for the
East Mediterranean from 6.25 million TEUs in 1998 to 13.40 million TEUs in 2012,
and for the Red Sea region from 1.42 million TEUs in 1998 to 7.25 million TEUs in
2012.  (World Container Demand, Ocean Shipping Consultants Ltd, 1999).
           4.  The involvement of major shipping lines, like Maersk-Sealand, and major
port operators like Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) and Port of Dubai Authority
(PDA) is very clear in current and, most likely, in future development projects.
           5.  These projects reflect the general trend of the global carriers to  serve
major but a limited number of hub ports, in addition to the growing sophisticated
requirements of these carriers; fast, efficient and timely service.
           6. The private sector is increasingly having the lion's share in port
development and operation which highlights the growing need for private sector
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involvement as a guarantee for efficient, cost-effective and  competitive service on
the one hand, and the governments' unwillingness to continue to be involved in
running and operating ports on the other.
These developments pose a real threat to the Port of Aqaba in the medium
and the long term in various aspects:
First, they are likely to have a comparative and competitive advantage over
the Port of Aqaba due to the huge investments made in building new terminals and
purchasing new equipment.  This means that they will be able acquire the most
advanced technologies in port operations which will result in a competitive service.
Second, the involvement of major shipping lines in these ports will ensure a
captive traffic for these ports.
Third, most of these ports are supported by sophisticated hinterland road and
rail networks which will enable them to provide a full service package and multi-
modal transport.
Fourth, in addition to the major shipping lines, some of these ports, like the
Israeli and Arabian Gulf ports, are served by large national shipping carriers which
are  Zim and United Arab Shipping Company (UASC) respectively.
Fifth, the network nature of these developments is worrying where a major
part of traffic will be concentrated in the hands of a few operators.
Sixth, the increasing number of newly-built terminals carries the risk of over-
capacity which may have a negative impact on smaller ports in terms of price and
competitiveness.
In light of the above, the Port of Aqaba is facing a real and serious challenge
which may leave it with a small market share of its own captive bulk exports and
limited feeder services coming from these large ports.  Unless necessary measures
are taken to develop the port at the same pace as other ports and benefit from the
emerging economic and political climate in the region, the situation may even
become worse.   However, weaknesses and strengths of the Port of Aqaba and the
ports mentioned above are necessary to be investigated prior to discussing the
possible ways and means of improving the competitive position of the Port of Aqaba
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in the face of these challenges.  This will be the area of discussion for the following
section.
4.3 Weaknesses and strengths of Aqaba Port and rival ports:
For the purpose of analysing the competitive position of the Port of Aqaba
and the rival ports, the following criteria will be used:
I. A comparison will be made between these ports using the following eleven
elements which are also considered vital for both the port and the port users
or customers: (Port Marketing, Ma Shuo, WMU, 2000).
1. Geographical position
2. Nautical access
3. Port facilities
4. Hinterland connections
5. Port cost
6. Output
7. Value added
8. Information technology and other services that can be offered
9. Labour force and social climate
10. Development and institutional structure
11. Flexibility to change
II.   The comparison will be made between the Port of Aqaba and the ports of Beirut,
Haifa, Ashdod, Jeddah and Dubai as they pose a more direct challenge to the Port of
Aqaba in terms of its local containerised and  imports and exports on the one hand,
transit cargo to and from surrounding countries via the Med. route and transit traffic
coming through the Red Sea route on the other.
III. The comparison approach will mainly focus on container traffic and container
berthing and handling facilities for the following reasons:
a. The general trend in world container trade is towards containerisation
which is anticipated to witness a considerable growth in the coming
decade as has been confirmed by a recent survey conducted by Ocean
Shipping Consultants Ltd. in 1999.
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b. All of the ports in the East Mediterranean and Red Sea regions are
focussing their development plans on enhancing their container
handling capacity either through building dedicated container handling
terminals or purchasing new container handling equipment.
c. The containerised traffic via the Port of Aqaba during the last ten years
has been growing steadily at the expense of the non-containerised
traffic  which has been declining almost at the same rate as shown in
graph 4.4 below.
Graph 4.4
Imports via Aqaba Port by mode of discharge from 90-98 in 000'
Source: Derived from Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
4.3.1  Geographical position:
This element is connected to the geographic location of the port in relation to
both the main shipping routes and the production and consumption zones.  Although
it has been repeatedly said that the Port of Aqaba is located  far from major shipping
routes (180 km from Tiran Straits), this distance through clear and open seas can not
be considered a severe hindrance to shipping lines if efficiency and handling speed at
the Port compensate for that.  The best example in this regard is the Port of Antwerp
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which is a tidal river.  Thus, the trip to the port can take up to 3 hours let alone the
time consumed in using the locks or in case of low tide and congestion.
 The Port of Aqaba enjoys an ideal location deep in land which assures a short
transit for eastern traffic in comparison with other ports.  Mediterranean ports, on the
other hand, enjoy an ideal location for western traffic as the distance and sailing time
to these ports is shorter and ships calling at these ports don not have to use the Suez
Canal.  As far as the hinterland is concerned,  although the northern and the central
parts of Jordan as well as Iraq have been traditionally considered a hinterland for the
Port of Aqaba, the picture after the peace  process  and the rehabilitation  of  Beirut
Port and Syrian ports will be different.   Also, with the development of hinterland
transport systems and assuming that border and other trade barriers are removed,
these areas can be looked at as a hinterland for the Mediterranean ports, especially
the ports of Haifa, Ashdod  and Beirut.  The same thing can be said about Dubai Port
which sees Iraq and most of Middle Eastern countries as its hinterland for the eastern
traffic.  Table 4.4 shows overland distances between the concerned ports and some
major cities and industrial zones in the region.
Table 4.4
Distances table in  km
                 City
Port
Amman Irbid Baghdad Damascus
Aqaba 334 405 1225 551
Beirut 306 235 1000 70
Haifa 260 180 1100 250
Ashdod 170 235 1070 400
Source: Distances Atlas and other sources
4.3.2  Nautical access:
For this element, the ship draft will be the main factor to be taken into account as
the ports in question have no lock or severe tidal constraints.  The maximum ship
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draft available in the dedicated container terminals of these ports is as follows:
Table 4.5
Ports' ship draft
Port Draft in meters
Aqaba 20
Beirut 15
Haifa 13.6
Ashdod 14
Jeddah 14.5
Dubai 15
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics & concerned ports'web sites
While the ports on the Mediterranean are located in the open sea and so have
to be protected by breakwaters, the Port of Aqaba has the advantage of being
naturally sheltered by mountains from the east and the west providing favourable
weather and navigational conditions and a clear entrance all around the year.
4.3.3  Port facilities:
This element will take into consideration both ship and containerised cargo
facilities including the number of container handling cranes, dedicated container
berths and storage capacity for different purposes.  The container stacking storage
capacity will be included although  it is effected by the dwelling time of the container
and the number of stacking tiers which differs from port to port.  Table 4.6 shows the
container berthing  facilities, container handling shore cranes and the storage
capacity for each port.
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Table 4.6
Container handling cranes & storage and berthing facilities
Port Panamax G.C Post-Pan. G.C Berth length/m Storage/sqm
Aqaba 2 0 540 311000
Beirut 0 4 1000 90000
Haifa 5 3 1180 14940
Ashdod 7 0 916 31000
Jeddah 0 17 2680 2100001
Dubai 15 82 - 431800
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics & concerned  ports' Web sites
4.3.4  Hinterland connections:
This element is increasingly becoming a decisive factor in port competition in
view of its impact on the total cost and the supply chain operation.  The availability
and cost of road and rail facilities connecting the port with overland production and
consumption areas and the transit time between ports and these areas can boom or
doom a port's competitive position.  For this element, border barriers and the average
labour cost will be used as an indicator for hinterland transport costs.  A modern road
network links the Port of Aqaba with major cities in Jordan and the surrounding
countries.  In general, one can say that the region is linked with a relatively good
road network.  With regard to rail service, this is not widely used and is still far
below the requirements of the potential future trade growth.  However, there are
plans to link Jordan with other countries in the region with a standard gauge rail
network.
4.3.5  Port costs:
This element will be based on the handling cost per one TEU in the ports
concerned with a view to the average sea freight rate to Aqaba from New York,
Rotterdam and Japan according to a survey carried out by The Services Group, Inc.
                                                          
1 Used for containers, general cargo, RoRo and vehicles
2 1998 statistics
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in their Aqaba Freeport and Special Economic Zone Study conducted in 1998.
(TSG, Aqaba Free Port and Special Economic Zone Study, 1998)
Table 4.7
Sea freight and Port Handling Charges (US $ per 20' container)
Port                 Average port handling charges         Average sea freight rates
Aqaba Port 95 New York 1900-2900*
Rotterdam 550 - 600
Japan 650
Port Said Port 82-130 New York 600-900
Rotterdam 224-308
Japan 1200-1425
Jeddah Port 80-106** New York 1000-1350
Rotterdam 450-600
Japan 450-600
Haifa Free Port 100 New York 1400-1500
Rotterdam 350
Japan 950
Jebel Ali Port 110-1603 New York 1200-2300
Rotterdam 700-900
Japan 450-900
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Collected from a survey of 20 freight forwarders operating in the region.
*  Includes Suez Canal fee plus handling in USA
** Handling charges levied on imports only
As far as Beirut Port is concerned, the handling charges per TEU are as
follows:
Beirut Port $200 (includes delivery and receiving operation
to and from town) (local market fee)
$75 (Free zone, transit, re-export and export fee)
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From the above table, we can conclude that, while the handling cost per 20'
container and sea freight rates to Japan (eastern cargo) are competitive for the Port of
Aqaba, sea freight rates to Europe and the USA are not, although a recent decision by
the Suez Canal Authority to reduce transit fees on ships calling at Aqaba Port
carrying containers or wheat in bulk by 20% and 10% respectively may help to
bridge the gap.
 4.3.6 Output:
For this element, container traffic in the ports concerned during the past 10
years will be looked into in order to assess the development rate and the performance
of each port in container handling.  The development in container traffic in the
concerned ports from 1990 to 1998 was as follows:
Table 4.8
             Container traffic in 000’ TEUs
Port 1990 1996 1998 Growth rate
90/98
Aqaba 83.3 139.3 174.3 109%
Beirut - - 157.07 -
Haifa 277 470 530 91%
Ashdod 176 339 364 107%
Jeddah 549.9 827.1 974.9 77%
Dubai 916.3 2247 2772.9 203%
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics, Ocean Shipping Consultants Ltd.
These figures show that container traffic in Dubai Port has the highest growth
rate followed by the Port of Aqaba then Ashdod.  This reveals two facts:
1. That the container traffic in the Middle East is growing steadily and will witness
more growth in the coming years.
2. The container traffic is gaining ground at the expense of break-bulk traffic as
shown in the case of the Port of Aqaba earlier in this chapter.
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 The 1999 published standard handling rate per TEU is 385 UAE DH which is equal to $105.
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4.3.7  Value Added:
Although the availability of value added facilities and the ability of each port
to create value out if its traffic may give an indication about value added activities
and returns in each port, the non-availability of sufficient data about this element and
about the tariff and tariff structure of the rival ports makes it difficult to estimate the
value added in these ports.  However, the availability and size of stuffing and
unstuffing areas may serve as an indicator of the added value in each port because
the availability of such facilities is likely to enhance and attract value added
activities while the lack of them may hinder such activities.  Table 4.9 shows
stuffing/unstuffing facilities in the concerned ports.
Table 4.9
Container stuffing/unstuffing areas
Port CFS covered area in sqm
Aqaba 18.119
Beirut -
Haifa 9340
Ashdod 10.000
Jeddah 5 sheds
Dubai 27.140
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics, Ports' web sites
4.3.8  Information technology:
 This factor includes the use of information technology in port operations and
services offered to port customers.  Ports with this advantage can have a competitive
edge over other ports because this element reflects the ability of the port to offer
better, cost-effective and fast services which are the main customer requirements
these days.  Among the ports concerned, the Port of Dubai is the only port that has
advanced computer systems for different operations as has been mentioned earlier in
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this chapter.  Haifa Port has a computerised control centre for container operations
but on a limited scale.
4.3.9  Labour force and social climate:
This element refers to the cost of labour and other social climate aspects such
as strikes, over-manning and labour union matters.  With regard to the social climate
and labour-related  problems, Jordan is considered one of the most stable countries in
the region with a well-organised labour force with no labour disputes or strikes.
Also, the workforce in Jordan is abundant, and highly competitive in terms of skills
and wages.  However, for comparison purposes and due to lack of sufficient
information about the social climate in other ports, only the average labour cost per
hour in the concerned countries will be taken as an indicator of the labour cost in the
ports sector.  The average labour cost per hour was calculated by dividing the 1999
GNP per capita in each country according to the World Bank Releases, by 12
(months), then by 30 (days), then by 6 (the average daily working hours).
Table 4.10
Average labour cost per hour in selected countries
Country GNP / Capita in US$ Average labour cost/hr in US$
Jordan 1553 0.75
Israel 15940 7.3
UAE 18220 8.3
S. Arabia 9510 4.5
Lebanon 3560 1.6
Bahrain 7600 3.5
Japan 32380 14.9
USA 29340 13.5
Source: Derived from World Bank Releases
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4.3.10   Development and institutional structure:
This element is related to issues like the development plans for each port,
tariff structure, flexibility to modify or set a new tariff and  the freedom to take
decisions.  As far as development plans are concerned, it has been seen that most of
the ports have ambitious plans for future development.  As far as the Port of Dubai is
concerned, it is a well-established port and has the flexibility and the capital needed
for any expansions required.  The ports of Haifa, Ashdod, Beirut and Jeddah have
almost completed their expansion projects and still have plans for further expansions.
As for the Port of Aqaba, it has a plan to expand the container terminal by 60m to
become 600m long, and to purchase a post-panamax container crane and three
straddle carriers which are expected to be delivered by the end of this year.  With
regard to decision-taking, the ports of Jeddah, Beirut and Dubai relatively have more
flexibility  in taking decisions than the ports of Aqaba and the Israeli Ports because
the former ports are privately operated.  However, the Port of Aqaba provides
considerable reductions on transit and transhipment cargo.  On the other hand, DPA
has a multi-layer tariff which includes a standard tariff for TEU transhipment
volumes under 6000 moves and a reduced tariff beyond that.
4.3.11  Flexibility to change:
This element is linked to the degree of port autonomy or independence and its
ability to respond to economic changes and customer requirements.  The more the
port is distanced from government domain the higher the freedom it has to take
decisions and respond adequately to market changes.  Due to their privatisation
policy, the ports of Dubai, Jeddah and Beirut have more flexibility than the other
ports though the Port of Aqaba is presently taking serious steps to commercialise and
privatise its container handling operations.
Based upon the above analysis, a competitive spidergram will be developed
for each of the five ports based on the afore-mentioned eleven elements of
competition  (Roman numerals I-XI in the first row of the table below) according to
their role in the competitiveness of the port using a scale from 1 to 5 where the best
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competitive advantage was given the highest point while less competitive advantages
were given lower points as shown in table 4.11.  The geographical position will be
assessed twice; the first to indicate the comparative advantage for Western Traffic
(I W) while the second for Eastern Traffic (I E).  However, due to their importance in
competition, the following five elements (shown in bold print in the table below) will
be given more weight and, accordingly, will be double-counted:
1. Geographical  position (IW – IE)
2. Port facilities (III)
3. Information technology (VIII)
4. Flexibility to change (XI)
5. Port costs (V)
Table 4.11
Ranking of concerned ports according to the elements of competition
IW-IE II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI total
Aqaba  1     4 5 2 5 4 4 4 2 5 3 3 58
Beirut  4     1 3 3 4 2 2 1 2 4 5 4 51
Haifa  5     1 3 3 4 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 55
Ashdod  5     1 3 2 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 52
Jeddah  1     5 4 4 5 3 2 4 4 3 5 4 65
Dubai  1     5 4 5 5 1 5 5 5 1 5 5 69
The following spidergram reflects the strengths and weaknesses of each port
using these eleven comparison elements.
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Graph 4.5:
Graph 4.6 below shows the competitive position of the concerned ports under
the selected five competition elements.
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Graph 4.6:
The total ranking of each port is shown by the following cones.
Graph 4.7:
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Thus, it is noticed that Haifa port has the highest ranking among the
Mediterranean ports and so has a competitive edge over the other ports particularly in
terms of transit time, total cost and location.  On the other hand, the ports of Dubai
and Jeddah will be the dominant ports for the cargo coming from the East due to
their location and facilities.  However, the Port of Aqaba can benefit from its
location close to the hinterland, good overland connections, deep water, cheap labour
force and, most importantly, the incentives provided by the Suez Canal Authority to
ships calling or originating from Aqaba in order to attract direct and feeder ship calls
and serve as a transit point to the surrounding countries including Israel.  This issue
will be tackled in more detail in the next chapter when building a competitive
strategy for the Port is discussed.
4.4 Competition implications:
It has been seen so far that the world, in general and the Middle East in
particular, are pregnant with changes and developments.  New terminals are being
born, new operators appearing and new technologies are being introduced.  These
changes are giving birth to unprecedented  competition.  The Port of Aqaba has no
choice but to find its way through these challenges.  It has to adapt itself to such
challenges and investigate the opportunities brought about by them and look for new
horizons.  Although the threat may not come tomorrow,  it is real and the Port should
be prepared to face it.  This can be done through market analysis, aggressive
marketing, understanding of customers' needs, strategic planning and above all
putting the Port's house in order.  The emerging free trade environment requires,
among many others, free-handed decision makers, flexible policies and competitive
management.
I would like to close this chapter with the following excerpt from the
proceedings of the Port of Hamburg Seminar on Port Marketing held in WMU from
14-18 June 1999 which will be used also as a basis for the discussion in the
following chapter.
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The law of competition tells us  that a missing opportunity
can become a threat to the port from its rivals.  The wants and needs
of customers are not homogenous and everlasting, they are fast-
changing and in various forms.  Ports have to constantly examine a
number of areas from where the opportunities and threats will most
likely come.  It is important that such an examination should always
be done in comparison with the competing ports.
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Chapter Five
5  Developing a business strategy:
5.1  Introduction:
It has been understood from the discussion in the previous chapters that the
Port of Aqaba operates in an increasingly competitive environment, an environment
which is very demanding and very challenging.  Such a situation requires strategic
planning and far-sighted decisions taking into consideration the changes taking place
in the region and other changes taking place in the business world of today, a world
which is no longer predictable and constant but uncertain, fast changing and directed
by competence and high performance.  Therefore, the strategy of the Port of Aqaba
should be built on these new business values and norms.  In his book Management
Challenges for the 21st Century, Drucker states that "Every organisation operates on
a Theory of the Business, that is a set of assumptions as to what its business is, what
its objectives are, how it defines results, who its customers are, what the customers
value and pay for.  Strategy converts this Theory of the Business into performance.
Its purpose is to enable an organisation to achieve its desired results in an
unpredictable environment".  (Drucker, 1999, p.43).1
In such an 'unpredictable environment', having a clear vision of the future
may not seem an easy task.  However, the Port of Aqaba has no option but to assess
its  external and internal environment, identify the constraints and threats, address the
problems and focus on the opportunities.  This task will be done by conducting a
                                                          
1 Quoted from Michael C. Ircha’s article “North American Port Reform” prepared for possible
publication in International Journal of Maritime Economics, Feb. 2000.
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SWOT analysis which will be the area of discussion later in this chapter.  The next
section will discuss the anticipated traffic via the Port in the next ten years.
5.2  Demand forecast:
Port traffic forecasting is a systematic process which requires a wide
knowledge of economic, commercial and market trends.  Therefore, such
knowledge is not easy to grasp making the whole process subject to uncertainty and
ambiguity.  However, there are various tools that may help in estimating the future
trend of traffic such as looking at the past traffic, fluctuations and events whether
political or seasonal or industrial or agricultural, technological changes, growth of
economic indictors like GDP and population, and other trade and transport policies.
In 1996, an attempt was made by a study team to forecast traffic via the Port of
Aqaba up to 2010.1  In this study, three scenarios were selected based on two main
factors that were believed to have the greatest impact on the traffic via the Port,
which are the progress of the peace process in the Middle East and the lifting of
sanctions on Iraq.  The following graph shows the result of this forecast (middle
case) compared with the actual traffic as of 1999.
Graph 5.1
Comparison between JICA forecast and actual throughput in '000 tons
Source: JICA report and Aqaba Port statistics
                                                          
1 This study was conducted by Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA).  For more
information, see their final report, pp13-40.
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However, if we assume an annual growth rate equal to that during the last
nine years (see Chapter 2, graph 2.2) which was around 2% taking 1999 throughput
as a basis, we will have the following trend:
Graph 5.2
JICA forecast in comparison with 2% growth of 1999 throughput in '000 tons
Source: JICA report and Aqaba Port statistics
In JICA's forecast, future cargo volumes were estimated using the GDP and
the population growth indexes for break-bulk, containers and bulk cargo as far as
foodstuffs are concerned, while project plans and world and regional market trends
indexes were used for the industrial and transit cargo forecast.  From the above
graphs, it is clear that JICA's forecast does not reflect reality as it included over-
estimations even in the lower case where the year 2010 forecasted figure was 26.645
million tons.  The reasons for this can be:
1. Over-estimation of project plans and bulk exports.1
2. Linking cargo growth to GDP and population growth rates.
The second reason is of special importance.  A regression and correlation
analysis was carried out to identify the relation between cargo throughput in the Port
on the one hand and population, GDP, GNP, GDP per capita and GNP per capita on
                                                          
1 It is worth-mentioning that such estimates were provided to the study team by concerned industries
and companies.
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the other. This showed that the cargo throughput and these variables are not highly
correlated. (Appendix B).  This may be due to the following reasons:
1. The bulk of Jordan's external trade is with neighbouring countries,
particularly Iraq and GCC states.
2. The emergence of other accesses to Jordan's trade via Mediterranean ports.
3. The use of other modes of transport like road and air transportation.
Although the first and the third reasons can not be overlooked in this regard, the
second one is more likely to be the main force behind this lack of correlation and is
likely carry more weight in the medium and the long run.
5.3  SWOT analysis:
A SWOT analysis outlines the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
threats that every organisation has in a business environment.  This analysis should
include both the external and internal environment factors where the external
environment focuses on the opportunities and threats while the internal environment
focuses on strengths and opportunities.  In this connection, geographical,
commercial, physical, institutional, technical and financial features will be looked at
in addition to factors related to forces of change.   Although it is difficult for the port
to meet all changing trade requirements, the port's ability to turn these factors of
market change into opportunities instead of threats is vital for the development and
survival of the port.  Having a quick glance at the economic and political changes in
the region and other forces of change discussed earlier in chapter three, it can be
noticed that the following challenges face the Port of Aqaba.  They will be
categorised into external threats, external opportunities, internal strengths and
internal weaknesses as follows:
5.3.1  External threats:
• Political factors:
-    Trade diversion to Mediterranean ports as a result of the peace process.
• Technology:
- The introduction of new cargo handling equipment in rival ports.
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- The introduction of information technology in rival ports.
- The growth of vessel size which requires fast and high quality service on
the one hand and reduces the number of port calls on the other.
- The development and possible introduction of non-ISO size containers to
the region which requires new and higher capacity handling equipment.
- Improved inland transport connections which contribute to the expansion
of a port's hinterland and consequently trigger fiercer inter-port
competition.
• Globalisation:
- Developing the supply chain, the multi-modal or the integrated continual
transportation  network   which   reduces  the   port's  role  and  provides a
      substitute service by other modes of transport.
- Over-supply due to increased capacities.
- The increasingly sophisticated customer requirements.
- Consolidation and alliances in the shipping industry.
- Appearance of fourth generation network ports run either by global port
operators or shipping lines.
5.3.2 External opportunities:
-     Relaxation or lifting of sanctions on Iraq.
- The expected growth and improvement of the economies of the countries
in the region as a result of the political relaxation.
- The very favourable trade relations that Jordan enjoys with neighbouring
countries and a privileged and preferential access to most international
markets like the EU, North America, Japan, Australia and Scandinavia.
- The anticipated growth in regional container traffic in the next ten years.
- Consolidation of trade and economic relations among countries in the
region.
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5.3.3  Internal strengths:
- The location of the Port close to a large hinterland, a link between Arab
countries in Asia and Africa and a transit point for neighbouring
countries.
- A good infrastructure especially concerning bulk handling facilities.
- The good reputation of the Port with regard to the social and operation
environment; no strikes, relatively good service at a reasonable price, no
congestion, no labour disputes, no record of excessive loss, pilferage or
damages and finally the availability of deep water.
- The availability of other services like airports, hotels, banks, reliable road
network and transportation services.
- A promising emerging economy and market with a favourable investment
climate especially after the introduction of economic reforms,
privatisation and the revision of all related laws and regulations and the
recent government decision to convert the Aqaba region into a Special
Economic Zone.
5.3.4  Internal weaknesses:
- “Relative” port distance from main shipping routes.
- Information technology and EDI in the Port lags behind other rival ports.
- Continued civil service mentality in the port whether in operations,
decision-making, employment, level of flexibility of port tariff, etc.
- Capacity constraints in container operations in terms of productivity,
equipment, IT and terminal layout.
- Lack of sufficient integration, communication and co-ordination among
port community.
- Non-availability of sufficient cargo base to justify frequent and bigger
ship calls.
Having identified the internal and the external environment factors that may
have an impact on the competitive position of the port, the following section will be
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dedicated to formulating alternatives and solutions taking into account these factors.
The same factors will be used later in this chapter as a basis for developing a
marketing strategy for the Port.
5.4  Prospects and Alternatives:
5.4.1  Introduction:
In view of the competition elements mentioned in the previous chapter, the
changes that have taken place regionally and globally with regard to the shipping
industry, the emergence of new technologies and the appearance of new players in
the region, the Port of Aqaba should look for alternatives and prospects to enhance
its market share.  These should include serving as an efficient feeder port, increasing
its own captive traffic and attracting new traffic, particularly, transit, bulk and
containerised cargo.  However, before discussing these alternatives, areas that ports
can look into in their search for new business particularly container traffic will be
briefly reviewed.  (Shuo Ma, Port Marketing, 2000).
1. Being a dedicated hub port.
2. Being a hub and load centre.
3. Being a direct call port.
4. Being a feeder port.
5. Being a transit port.
For the port to become a hub, there are several requirements which include:
- Geographical location: The port should be located on main shipping
routes adjacent to major hinterland and trade activities.   The best
examples are the ports of Malta, Hong Kong and  Singapore.
- The availability of sufficient cargo base to justify calls of big ships.
- The availability of sufficient infrastructure and equipment like cargo
handling and berthing facilities.
- A quality performance and competitive cost are a must as big ships
calling such ports require fast, cost-effective and high quality
performance.
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- Reliable and flexible labour: This is vital to avoid any unnecessary delays
and ensure high productivity.
- Effective information services such as IT and EDI.
- Efficient  administrative services and flexible decision-taking process.
Such requirements are also necessary for the port to be a hub and load centre
and a direct call port with an additional requirement, that is having a large hinterland
traffic.  These requirements along with the following factors have a direct and
decisive impact on the decision of the shipping lines to select a port of call:
- Port efficiency resulting in fast handling and short turnaround time.
- Reasonable overall costs.
- Zero default
- Zero delays.
- Overall supply chain cost.
5.4.2  Alternatives:
The Port of Aqaba has unsuccessfully been trying to attract transhipment
traffic due to its location at a relative distance from main shipping routes and ports of
neighbouring countries coupled with container handling equipment constraints.  The
result is that the volumes of transhipped cargo remained very limited (2% in 1998).
Therefore, the alternatives that will be reviewed hereunder will focus on the activities
that generate high added value and which are more appropriate for the conditions of
the Port.
As has been mentioned earlier, the location of the Port of Aqaba has been a
major  factor for making it a transit centre for cargo going to and originating from
many neighbouring countries as  shown in chapter three.  In light of this, the first
alternative for the Port should be to consolidate its position as a transit point for
incoming and outgoing cargo to and from neighbouring countries.  This can be
achieved in many ways including reducing land transport costs, improving port and
transport services and creating an integrated port community. Volumes of incoming
transit cargo distributed among different countries during the period between 1983
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and 1998 have been reviewed in chapter three.  It is worth mentioning here that 1999
saw volumes of transit cargo imported to both Israel and the Palestinian Authority
which amounted to 11238 ton to Israel and 2003 ton to the Palestinian Authority.
Also, transit traffic was not restricted to incoming cargo but there were considerable
volumes of exported cargo originating from different countries, especially Iraq.
Thus, the Port of Aqaba has the potential to be a transit centre for most of the
surrounding countries, and so, this is one of the options that the Port can make use of
in the future.
However, it has to be realised that this option may not be easy to realise and
efforts in this direction should start from the Ministry of Transport, which is the
umbrella authority of the transportation and maritime sectors.  A meeting with the
participation of all concerned parties should be organised to identify the problem,
discuss it and propose an action plan.  A follow-up committee can be formed to
monitor, assess and report progress and the implementation of the plan.
The second alternative for the Port is to make use of its good bulk handling
facilities and of Jordan's position as a major producer of phosphate, fertilisers,
potash, Dead Sea salts and other related industries to serve as a bulk handling centre
especially for Israeli bulk exports.  This issue has been an area of discussion between
the concerned authorities in the two countries on more than one occasion.  This
alternative has been enhanced by the fact that three major joint ventures involving
companies from Japan, India and Norway have been established in Aqaba and the
former two have been working for several years.
 Reaching this target requires a joint effort between the Port, the Fertilisers
Co, Arab Potash Co. and other chemical industries. A committee can be set up for
the purpose of surveying the market, approaching consumers and producers in the
region and providing sufficient and reliable information about the Port’s capabilities
in this field.
The third alternative is to make use of the ferry link between Jordan and
Egypt (Aqaba-Nwebe´ ferry line) and of Aqaba-Eilat-Southern Red Sea region as a
major tourist attraction area to attract passenger, vehicle and cargo traffic originating
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from and going to North Africa in addition to cruise-ships.  This traffic from 1986 to
1998 is shown in table 2.7 in chapter two.
Increasing the number of passengers and cruise-ships can be reached by
launching an aggressive marketing campaign with the participation of the Port
Authority, Arab Bridge Maritime Co., Ministry of Tourism, travel agents and other
local authorities.  This step should be preceded by improving the services provided to
ferry users.
The fourth alternative is to enhance container handling capacity and
efficiency in order to meet the anticipated growth in container traffic locally and
regionally.  This should include purchasing new equipment, training staff,
introducing information technology, improving land transport and simplifying all
related administrative procedures and formalities.
This issue carries special importance because of the reasons mentioned in this
paper on top of which is the fierce competition in container handling.  Purchasing
new handling equipment, training staff, introducing IT and co-ordinating the efforts
of all concerned parties are only a few of the many measures needed to improve this
aspect.  Training programmes where refresher and training courses are provided
within a work plan are necessary and badly needed.  On the other hand, necessary
capital to purchase new equipment and introduce IT can be sought by opening the
door to private sector participation.
However, trade prospects for the Port of Aqaba should not be restricted to the
aforementioned alternatives as in today's business there is room for several
opportunities in view of the anticipated boom in container traffic in the region.  This
element, in addition to the creation of several hub ports in the Red Sea area, should
provide an opportunity for the Port of Aqaba to serve as a main feeder port for
distribution and transit purposes.  In addition to these major alternatives, the Port
should look into all other possible areas which can contribute to enhancing its role
and increase its market share such as:
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1.  Entering into co-operation arrangements with rival ports:
The aim of this option is to create a chain of friendly rivals.  By this, the Port can,
first, make up for the expected loss of cargo to other rival ports and, second, face the
pressure of other terminal operators, be they port authorities or shipping lines.
According to this option, arrangements can be made where the Port of Aqaba, for
example, is entrusted with handling Eastern traffic for Port A on the Med., while port
A is entrusted with handling Western traffic for the Port of Aqaba.  This arrangement
can be for one or more types of cargo.  Through this deal, the Port of Aqaba can
attract additional traffic and at the same time avoid unnecessary competition.  For
example, the port of Aqaba has the capacity to handle Israeli exports to the Far East
like potash produced in the Dead Sea area, Israeli break-bulk and container imports
and other agricultural products, while Israeli ports can be used to handle Jordan’s
exports of manufactured goods and imports of general cargo, particularly foodstuffs,
going to and coming from Europe.  The same applies to other countries like
Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian Authority. This, of course, should be done within a
win-win formula where both sides benefit from this co-operation.
2. Adapting to changing trade patterns and requirements:
Although this option may seem difficult to achieve in the short run because it
means additional costly investments in purchasing new equipment, introducing
information technology systems and providing fast, quality and efficient service,
however, to survive in a fast changing world, the Port of Aqaba has no option but to
adapt to these requirements through a long term plan and invite the private sector to
participate in port development and operations.
3. Enhancing the commercial side of port operations:
In order to improve performance and respond to trade changes and competition
requirements, governments today tend to disengage themselves from port operations.
This trend is very clear in most of the ports in the region like Dubai, Jeddah, Salalah,
Beirut and the major Egyptian ports.  This policy does not necessarily mean
privatisation of port activities (although this option should not be excluded,
especially in handling and equipment maintenance operations), but can be done
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through creating a pro-business culture in the Port including flexibility in decision
making and tariff enforcement.
4.   Building an effective marketing strategy based on the needs and wants of
both the customer and the market.  This element will be the area of discussion in
the next section although the needs of the market are difficult to foresee due to the
changing conditions the uncertain nature of the future.
5.5 Building a marketing strategy:
Marketing can be defined as "the process whereby an organisation seeks to
identify, quantify and anticipate the needs and wants of its markets both present, and
potential and develops the product or service to satisfy such wants. (Shuo Ma, Port
Marketing, WMU, 2000).
 Thus, the purpose of marketing is to create a commercial environment where
both the market and the customer are surveyed, their needs are identified and then
fulfilled.  This is increasingly becoming necessary in a dynamic and fast changing
world where competition is high and trade barriers are diminishing.  The idea of
fortified and seemingly impregnable port captive position has lost much of its
validity and begun to weaken.  These changes scraped the old belief of 'captive
hinterlands' and replaced it with 'shared hinterlands'.
In view of these changes, a commercial marketing strategy will be proposed
taking into account the three marketing pillars; product, price and promotion.
Bearing in mind the ten elements that make up the product and determine the
competitiveness of the port discussed in chapter four, the proposed strategy will be
based on both Porter's three generic strategies; leadership, differentiation and focus
(Porter, M E, Competitive Strategy, 1980) and UNCTAD's four marketing strategies;
to be a market leader, a market challenger, a market follower or a market nicher.
In fact, there is no fundamental difference between these two approaches as they
view the marketing strategy with a mixture of market and customer orientation.
They, further, propose the right marketing policy to be followed based on the
organisation's competitive position and its ability to influence or benefit from the
market.  In other words, to be in the front, in the flank or in the aft.  According to
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Porter, the organisation can select an overall cost leadership strategy where the focus
is on offering the lowest cost without neglecting the quality, or a differentiation
strategy where the organisation should offer a unique and distinct service or a focus
strategy whereby a specific traffic/cargo/customer is serviced (nicher).  UNCTAD's
strategies almost fall into the same category where the market leader represents both
the overall leadership and differentiation strategies, while the nicher represents the
focus strategy.
As to the Port of Aqaba, its approach to marketing should be based on
differentiation and focus strategies.
5.5.1 Differentiation:
The Port of Aqaba should strive to provide a quality and cost-effective level of
service to both ships and shippers, which should include:
1. Reducing ship turnaround time by co-ordination and improvement of all ship-
related services like customs, health, land transport, shipping agencies, etc, in
such a way that ensures the elimination of unnecessary delays on the one hand
and raising productivity on the other.
2. Acquiring cargo handling technology, particularly container handling equipment.
3. Improving cargo-related services; value added, storage, distribution, damage and
loss free, etc.
4. Introducing information technology at both port and port community levels.
5. Commercialising port activities including management, operations and pricing.
6. Introducing an effective Customer Relation Management (CRM) system, which
is a very important factor in the differentiation strategy.
5.5.2 Focus:
It has been noticed from the discussion in previous chapters that the location of
the Port of Aqaba gives it the advantage of being a transit port for the region.  In fact,
the Port has played that role very successfully in the past two decades as shown
earlier.  Also, due to the fact that Jordan is one of the major producers of phosphate,
potash and fertilisers, the Port has good facilities for handling these products and so
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it is qualified to be a focus regional point for handling these materials.  In light of
this, the Port should focus on the following areas:
1. To benefit from its location to attract transit traffic.  This should be accompanied
by the measures mentioned above to cut overall costs as much as possible.
2. To improve the container handling capacity through the measures mentioned
earlier.
3. To attract bulk traffic, especially the Israeli Dead Sea products of potash.  In this
regard, building the Dead-Red railway connection is important.
4. To attract cruise-ship traffic taking advantage of the existence of tourist
attractions both in Jordan and in the surrounding countries like Egypt, Palestine
and Israel.
5. To take necessary measures to improve and upgrade the Aqaba-Nuwebe' ferry
service and introduce it as an international link connecting Africa with Asia in
general and the tourism-rich Egypt with tourism and religious attractions in
Jordan and Palestine in particular.
The above points are only ideas that can be built on to consolidate the
competitive setting of the Port of Aqaba.  Although today's world is pregnant
with challenges and surprises, however, it is full of opportunities which can be
taken advantage of through dedication, training, improving efficiency and
systematic planning.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions and recommendations
The peace process in the Middle East has triggered off a host of changes in
the region both on the economic and political levels.  These changes, along with
other global changes created by technological advances, globalisation and
deregulation trends have put much pressure on different economic activities in
Jordan including the Port of Aqaba which was one of the first to feel the heat.
Instead of being the only access to Jordan’s exports and imports, the Port started to
see part of its cargo sneaking through other rival ports located on the Mediterranean
facing Europe and North America like the ports of Haifa, Ashdod and Beirut.  These
ports provide shorter and cost-effective access to the country’s traffic going to or
originating from Europe and the USA avoiding the Suez Canal.  They also enjoy the
same advantage for Jordan’s transit traffic to neighbouring countries.  It is estimated
that about 55.6% of incoming containers, 67% of the total imports and 20% of the
exports (1998 figures), excluding transit traffic, is threatened to be lost to ports lying
on the Mediterranean coast.  Such a challenge, along with the challenge coming from
Red Sea and Arabian Gulf ports pose a threat also to the Aqaba  Port’s future efforts
to increase its market share.  Therefore, what once has been the Port’s captive
hinterland has now become a shared hinterland where the lion’s share is for the one
enjoying these advantages.   Such a new competitive environment poses a real
challenge to the Port.  The challenge of adapting to these changes, the challenge of
the ability to compete and the challenge of maintaining and, if possible, increasing its
market share.  Given these circumstances, and after the factors that make up the
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competitiveness of the port has been assessed, this paper suggests that the Port of
Aqaba has a lot to capitalise on.
First, the Port has an advantage of an established good infrastructure which
can be used without need to spend much capital on building new facilities.
Second, the Port has an advantage of proximity to European and rapidly
growing Asian markets.
Third, the Port has the necessary social and labour climate, particularly cheap
and skilled labour, which can provide an excellent business environment.
Fourth, the Port has the advantage of an emerging economy of a country
which has saved no effort in the direction of creating a healthy economic
environment, liberal economic policies, deregulation, investment-encouraging laws,
etc.
Finally, the recent decision to transform Aqaba into a Special Economic
Zone is likely to create new opportunities and generate more businesses for the Port.
In light of the above factors, and bearing in mind the Port’s traffic in the past
three decades, the Port can focus on the following areas in its effort to find its way
through the projected tough competition:
First, building upon the Port’s reputation as a transit point for surrounding
countries.  This requires facilitating all related procedures and setting up a unified
policy including not only the Port, but also other authorities and sectors like customs,
road transport, border police, etc.
Second, taking advantage of the good bulk handling infrastructure to attract
cargo like potash, Dead Sea products, fertilisers and agricultural chemicals to and
from neighbouring countries.
Third,  pressing on with the privatisation/commercialisation and
concessioning policy to  ensure  private sector participation in  port development and
operation.
Fourth, taking advantage of the projected growth in tourism and the heritage
and cultural attractions of the region to attract cruise-ship traffic.  Such traffic has
been very active in the past years as seen earlier in this dissertation.
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Fifth, co-ordination of the efforts of the port community such as, shipping
agents, land transport, freight forwarders, customs, shippers and other related
economic activities in order to ensure a unified direction.
Sixth, introduction of information technology in Port operations and other
relevant activities as in today’s business this factor is of primary importance in
ensuring distinct and quality service.
Seventh, taking advantage of the existence of chemical and fertiliser-related
businesses, the availability of some big companies' joint ventures in the area and the
transformation of Aqaba into a Special Economic Zone to transform the Port into a
logistics and multi-modal transport centre.
Eighth, putting more emphasis on developing human resources through
training.
Ninth, enhancing the container handling capacity and efficiency.
Finally, launching an aggressive marketing campaign to ensure that the Port
is introduced and presented to its users in a systematic, cultured, well-organised and
informative way.
The Port of Aqaba is one of Jordan’s main national assets and the above ideas
should serve as a basis for further discussions and studies to ensure the ‘smiling
mouth’ of Jordan remains smiling for ever.
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Appendix  A:
Export commodities via Aqaba Port in 1998 in tons
Country Phosph
ate
Fertilise
rs
Potas
h
Ceme
nt
G.C Trans
hipme
nt
Re-
expor
t
Empt
y
Cont.
Trans
it
Total
Far East 1220765 190720 572900 000 5967 000 282 16431 000 2007065
Indonesia 600200 000 13200 000 14 000 265 000 000 613679
Japan 160400 152220 40000 000 501 000 11 000 000 353132
Korea 153275 000 56250 000 1152 000 000 000 000 210677
Thailand 188350 000 15400 000 000 000 000 000 000 203750
Malaysia 22500 15300 165400 000 172 000 5 000 000 203377
China 000 000 165000 000 1153 000 1 3734 000 169888
Taiwan 96040 000 48550 000 85 000 000 000 000 144675
Philippines 000 23200 49100 000 1388 000 000 000 000 73688
Singapore 000 000 20000 000 1474 000 000 12697 000 34171
Vietnam 000 000 000 000 28 000 000 000 000 28
S.W.Asia 1250895 739962 543005 000 41405 111 366 7167 000 2582905
India 1223895 609212 490755 000 24128 89 345 4952 000 2353376
Iran 000 96500 52250 000 98 000 000 000 000 148848
Pakistan 27000 34250 000 000 16966 000 2 2209 000 80427
Srelanka 000 000 000 000 213 22 19 000 000 254
Aust&Newz 483350 000 55600 000 1267 000 154 000 000 590371
Australia 402350 000 12600 000 1195 000 42 000 000 416187
Newzeland 81000 000 43000 000 72 000 112 000 000 124184
Gulf States 000 000 000 37682 99767 2234 25729 26626 6607 198645
S.Arabia 000 000 000 000 27909 000 24311 21975 6607 80802
 Gulf States 000 000 000 000 57051 1377 149 4651 000 63228
Yemen 000 000 000 37682 14807 857 1269 000 000 54615
East Africa 000 136339 15950 150800 106197 000 5949 1027 000 416262
Sudan 000 000 000 95000 13224 000 4844 000 000 113068
Ethiopia 000 97431 000 000 606 000 329 000 000 98366
Kenya 000 000 000 000 89252 000 460 000 000 89712
Eritrea 000 000 000 55800 523 000 2 000 000 56325
Djibouti 000 38908 000 000 1493 000 61 93 000 40555
S.Africa 000 000 1000 000 386 000 84 934 000 11404
Angola 000 000 3700 000 131 000 1 000 000 3832
Mozambique 000 000 2250 000 14 000 168 000 000 2432
Tanzania 000 000 000 000 550 000 000 000 000 550
Malagasy 000 000 000 000 18 000 000 000 000 18
N.&W.Africa 000 1500 34000 144280 25322 12681 1219 2982 57912 279896
Egypt 000 1500 7500 144280 16716 12681 1171 2982 56916 243746
Morocco 000 000 26500 000 131 000 000 000 000 26631
Algeria 000 000 000 000 5449 000 000 000 000 5449
Libya 000 000 000 000 2961 000 32 000 996 3989
Tunisia 000 000 000 000 65 000 16 000 000 81
West Europe 633290 000 266308 000 16174 49 1393 1238 000 918452
Netherlands 515990 000 37150 000 2083 000 17 000 000 555240
Finland 97300 000 000 000 2 000 000 000 000 97302
Italy 000 000 73363 000 4318 000 317 1238 000 79236
Spain 000 000 75845 000 733 000 3 000 000 76581
Greece 20000 000 51600 000 348 000 16 000 000 71964
France 000 000 14000 000 647 000 000 000 000 14647
Portugal 000 000 14350 000 60 000 000 000 000 14410
Britain 000 000 000 000 4573 000 55 000 000 4628
Germany 000 000 000 000 2749 49 191 000 000 2940
Belgium 000 000 000 000 613 000 772 000 000 1434
Malta 000 000 000 000 34 000 000 000 000 34
Denmark 000 000 000 000 000 000 22 000 000 22
Sweden 000 000 000 000 11 000 000 000 000 11
83
Ireland 000 000 000 000 3 000 000 000 000 3
East Europe 140235 000 5900 000 11651 000 372 000 000 158158
Bulgaria 116985 000 000 000 10425 000 000 000 000 127410
Macadonia 23250 000 5900 000 150 000 000 000 000 29300
Romania 000 000 000 000 37 000 372 000 000 409
Slovenia 000 000 000 000 191 000 000 000 000 191
Croatia 000 000 000 000 90 000 000 000 000 90
Lithuania 000 000 000 000 38 000 000 000 000 38
Ukraine 000 000 000 000 720 000 000 000 000 720
E.Mediterran 000 000 000 000 49706 719 9160 1159 18 60762
Turkey 000 000 000 000 47209 000 000 000 000 47209
Lebanon 000 000 000 000 1878 412 8296 000 000 10586
Israel 000 000 000 000 586 307 839 1159 000 2891
Syria 000 000 000 000 6 000 25 000 000 31
Palestine 000 000 000 000 7 000 000 000 18 25
Cyprus 000 000 000 000 20 000 000 000 000 20
USA/Canada 000 000 000 000 31802 000 1140 6 000 32948
USA 000 000 000 000 31012 000 1138 6 000 32156
Canada 000 000 000 000 790 000 2 000 000 792
S. America 000 000 14500 000 167 000 11 000 000 14678
Brazil 000 000 14500 000 8 000 000 000 000 14508
Colombia 000 000 000 000 76 000 11 000 000 87
Argentina 000 000 000 000 79 000 000 000 000 79
Chile 000 000 000 000 4 000 000 000 000 4
Others 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 100114 000 100114
Total 3728535 1068521 150816
3
332762 389425 15794 45775 156744 64537 7310256
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
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Appendix  B:
POPULA
TION:
IN 000'
GDP/GN
P
IN 000 $
YEAR POP. GDP GNP GDP/CAP. GNP/CAP.
1993 4152 3596 3459 1340 1325
1994 4268 3956 3859 1467 1410
1995 4387 6601 6360 1595 1537
1996 4509 6820 6540 1780 1789
1997 4635 7102 6789 1970 1895
1998 4764 7345 7123 2146 2020
1999 4897 7600 7355 2486 2310
year x y xy x2 y' y-y' (y-y')2 (y'-y-)2 (y-y-)2
1993 4125 11.63 47973.75 17015625 11.1 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.1
1994 4268 10.57 45112.76 18215824 11.4 -0.8 0.7 0.3 1.9
1995 4387 11.75 51547.25 19245769 11.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
1996 4509 12 54108 20331081 11.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1997 4635 12.31 57056.85 21483225 12.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
1998 4764 12.64 60216.96 22695696 12.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.5
1999 4897 12.8 62681.6 23980609 12.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7
31585 83.7 378697.2 142967829 83.7 0.0 1.0 2.4 3.4
Y- = 11.9571429
X- = 4512.14286
B = 7215.69 /
3162578
0.002
A = Y-  - BX = 1.7
Y = 11.9571429
Syx = 0.4 0.0
r2 = 0.835
y = 1.1919x + 3.907
R2 = 0.4644
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 2 4 6 8 10
Series1
Linear (Series1)
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GDP:
POPULA
TION:
IN 000'
GDP/GN
P
IN 000 $
YEAR POP. GDP GNP GDP/CAP. GNP/CAP.
1993 4152 3596 3459 1340 1325
1994 4268 3956 3859 1467 1410
1995 4387 6601 6360 1595 1537
1996 4509 6820 6540 1780 1789
1997 4635 7102 6789 1970 1895
1998 4764 7345 7123 2146 2020
1999 4897 7600 7355 2486 2310
year x y xy x2 y' y-y' (y-y')2 (y'-y-)2 (y-y-)2
1993 3596 11.63 41821.48 12931216 11.0 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.1
1994 3956 10.57 41814.92 15649936 11.1 -0.6 0.3 0.7 1.9
1995 6601 11.75 77561.75 43573201 12.1 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
1996 6820 12 81840 46512400 12.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
1997 7102 12.31 87425.62 50438404 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
1998 7345 12.64 92840.8 53949025 12.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5
1999 7600 12.8 97280 57760000 12.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.7
43020 83.7 520584.6 280814182 83.7 0.0 1.0 2.3 3.4
Y- = 11.9571429
X- = 6145.71429
B = 43317.99 /
114978874
0.000
A = Y-  - BX = 9.6
Y = 11.9571429
Syx = 0.4 0.0
r2 = 0.831
y = 1.1919x + 3.907
R2 = 0.4644
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 2 4 6 8 10
Series1
Linear (Series1)
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GNP:
POPULA
TION:
IN 000'
GDP/GN
P
IN 000 $
YEAR POP. GDP GNP GDP/CAP. GNP/CAP.
1993 4152 3596 3459 1340 1325
1994 4268 3956 3859 1467 1410
1995 4387 6601 6360 1595 1537
1996 4509 6820 6540 1780 1789
1997 4635 7102 6789 1970 1895
1998 4764 7345 7123 2146 2020
1999 4897 7600 7355 2486 2310
year x y xy x2 y' y-y' (y-y')2 (y'-y-)2 (y-y-)2
1993 3459 11.63 40228.17 11964681 11.0 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.1
1994 3859 10.57 40789.63 14891881 11.1 -0.6 0.3 0.7 1.9
1995 6360 11.75 74730 40449600 12.1 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
1996 6540 12 78480 42771600 12.2 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
1997 6789 12.31 83572.59 46090521 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
1998 7123 12.64 90034.72 50737129 12.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5
1999 7355 12.8 94144 54096025 12.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.7
41485 83.7 501979.1 261001437 83.7 0.0 1.0 2.3 3.4
Y- = 11.9571429
X- = 5926.42857
B = 41559.27 /
106004834
0.000
A = Y-  - BX = 9.6
Y = 11.9571429
Syx = 0.4 0.0
r2 = 0.830
y = 1.1919x + 3.907
R2 = 0.4644
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 2 4 6 8 10
Series1
Linear (Series1)
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GDP/CAPITA:
POPULA
TION:
IN 000'
GDP/GN
P
IN 000 $
YEAR POP. GDP GNP GDP/CAP. GNP/CAP.
1993 4152 3596 3459 1340 1325
1994 4268 3956 3859 1467 1410
1995 4387 6601 6360 1595 1537
1996 4509 6820 6540 1780 1789
1997 4635 7102 6789 1970 1895
1998 4764 7345 7123 2146 2020
1999 4897 7600 7355 2486 2310
year x y xy x2 y' y-y' (y-y')2 (y'-y-)2 (y-y-)2
1993 1340 11.63 15584.2 1795600 11.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.1
1994 1467 10.57 15506.19 2152089 11.4 -0.8 0.7 0.3 1.9
1995 1595 11.75 18741.25 2544025 11.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
1996 1780 12 21360 3168400 11.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1997 1970 12.31 24250.7 3880900 12.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
1998 2146 12.64 27125.44 4605316 12.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5
1999 2486 12.8 31820.8 6180196 13.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 0.7
12784 83.7 154388.6 24326526 83.7 0.0 1.0 2.4 3.4
Y- = 11.9571429
X- = 1826.28571
B = 10699.26 /
6855026
0.002
A = Y-  - BX = 9.1
Y = 11.9571429
Syx = 0.4 0.0
r2 = 0.840
y = 1.1919x + 3.907
R2 = 0.4644
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 2 4 6 8 10
Series1
Linear (Series1)
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GNP/CAPITA:
POPULA
TION:
IN 000'
GDP/GN
P
IN 000 $
YEAR POP. GDP GNP GDP/CAP. GNP/CAP.
1993 4152 3596 3459 1340 1325
1994 4268 3956 3859 1467 1410
1995 4387 6601 6360 1595 1537
1996 4509 6820 6540 1780 1789
1997 4635 7102 6789 1970 1895
1998 4764 7345 7123 2146 2020
1999 4897 7600 7355 2486 2310
year x y xy x2 y' y-y' (y-y')2 (y'-y-)2 (y-y-)2
1993 1325 11.63 15409.75 1755625 11.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.1
1994 1410 10.57 14903.7 1988100 11.3 -0.8 0.6 0.4 1.9
1995 1537 11.75 18059.75 2362369 11.6 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
1996 1789 12 21468 3200521 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1997 1895 12.31 23327.45 3591025 12.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
1998 2020 12.64 25532.8 4080400 12.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5
1999 2310 12.8 29568 5336100 13.0 -0.2 0.0 1.0 0.7
12286 83.7 148269.5 22314140 83.7 0.0 0.9 2.5 3.4
Y- = 11.9571429
X- = 1755.14286
B = 9547.95 /
5253184
0.002
A = Y-  - BX = 8.8
Y = 11.9571429
Syx = 0.4 0.0
r2 = 0.857
y = 1.1919x + 3.907
R2 = 0.4644
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0 2 4 6 8 10
Series1
Linear (Series1)
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Appendix  C:
                                                   Imported commodities via Aqaba Port in 1998
Flou
r
Rice Suga
r
Grains Veg.Oi
l
Cars Steel Timb
er
Min.
Oil
Cons
t.Ma
ter.
Am
moni
a
Bagg
ed
Carg
o
Froz
en
Meat
G.C Total
USA&C
anada
555 4134
9
000 597577 23166 7577 942 3006 1066 1264 3300
0
6036 2922 8071
0
799170
USA 555 4127
6
000 573903 22665 7576 869 1147 1045 1264 000 5656 2788 7784
0
736584
Canada 000 73 000 23674 501 1 73 1859 21 000 3300
0
380 134 2870 62586
West
Europe
4801 2125 8853
8
265950 20121 3459
0
47414 5696 6472 7579 97 1033
01
1938
7
3539
24
959995
Britain 000 000 000 202 42 3053 1565 32 170 903 000 1175
2
483 2918
5
47387
France 129 501 1003
2
243749 739 1147 524 83 500 392 000 3102 7538 3728
3
305719
Netherl. 000 139 444 428 5462 3228 1714 000 948 338 000 1773
4
5831 5171
8
87984
Belgium 000 364 7002
6
4139 569 1079
1
27839 362 2852 1797 000 3536
6
1831 9211
0
248046
Italy 4666 22 2006 1291 3085 935 6605 167 1859 2136 000 1843
1
674 5513
9
97016
Germany 6 172 6030 16120 1323 1467
4
5935 000 82 1597 000 1081
9
1080 4566
2
103500
Spain 000 927 000 21 138 629 1110 37 24 18 000 2690 1925 2756
1
35080
Greece 000 000 000 000 67 000 469 21 37 217 000 1811 000 2331 4953
Sweden 000 000 000 000 000 133 429 4963 000 000 000 177 000 1089
3
16795
Denmark 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 10 000 000 000 844 000 218 1072
Norway 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 131 97 147 000 231 606
Portugal 000 000 000 000 8696 000 1024 000 000 50 000 19 000 729 10518
Malta 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 25 429 454
Finland 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 21 000 000 000 409 000 435 865
E.Eur&
Russia
000 000 5848 210190 1429 4 314467 56 90 279 1457
06
5318 000 2789
7
711284
Ukraine 000 000 000 27820 000 000 88584 000 000 000 1402
54
75 000 1767
3
274406
Russia 000 000 000 32376 000 000 211426 000 000 000 000 159 000 918 244879
Estonia 000 000 000 52500 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 52500
Latvia 000 000 000 47545 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 47545
Romania 000 000 000 33769 000 000 5477 41 90 279 1004 207 000 1936 42803
Croatia 000 000 000 16180 000 000 1062 000 000 000 512 904 000 1875 20533
Poland 000 000 5848 000 000 000 6527 000 000 000 000 201 000 1485 14061
Bulgaria 000 000 000 000 1429 1 1361 000 000 000 3936 3644 000 685 11056
Slovenia 000 000 000 000 000 3 30 15 000 000 000 128 000 3321 3497
Hungary 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 4 4
E.Medit
eranean
1582 000 000 462297 1000 90 12285 6 199 29 000 914 40 1127
8
489720
Turkey 1560 000 000 462297 1000 31 12265 000 16 29 000 493 000 6978 484669
Cyprus 22 000 000 000 000 59 20 6 183 000 000 128 000 3736 4145
Israel 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 293 40 553 886
Lebanon 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 11 11
South
America
000 21 4518
0
358199 000 000 745 40 70 000 000 1416 905 9565
2
502228
Argentin
a
000 000 000 358135 000 000 90 40 70 000 000 906 633 8785
9
447733
Brazil 000 21 4518
0
64 000 000 655 000 000 000 000 465 272 7294 53951
Guatema
la
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 211 211
Costaric
a
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 131 131
Peru 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 21 000 70 91
90
Mexico 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 87 87
Colombi
a
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 24 000 000 24
N&W.
Africa
000 3084
5
000 340 1026 151 15754 86 28 000 2073
5
1155
9
283 2229
21
303728
Egypt 000 3084
5
000 340 1026 148 3424 26 28 000 2073
5
1132
1
207 2201
02
288202
Libya 000 000 000 000 000 000 11778 000 000 000 000 175 000 8 11961
Algeria 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1447 1447
Morocco 000 000 000 000 000 000 552 000 000 000 000 000 000 534 1086
Tunisia 000 000 000 000 000 3 000 000 000 000 000 20 000 776 799
Ivory
Cost
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 60 000 000 000 000 000 26 86
Namibia 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 76 000 76
Ghana 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 43 000 27 70
Nigeria 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1 1
Japan &
Far East
000 2424
7
18 21 124432 3664
3
31260 6946
6
1080 1113 60 4518
1
3320 2494
25
586266
Malaysia 000 000 000 000 108827 1519 51 4470 43 000 000 2874 000 6594 124378
Indonesi
a
000 000 000 000 13233 1064 515 6253
4
000 22 000 416 192 4205
5
120031
Singapor
e
000 8379 000 000 2034 598 2287 1491 915 69 60 1115
9
2792 8143
3
111217
China 000 2004 18 000 33 64 6741 40 45 726 000 2237
4
176 5454
7
86768
Korea 000 000 000 000 000 1464
3
10242 30 67 21 000 5980 000 3164
9
62632
Japan 000 000 000 21 84 1809
1
591 000 000 209 000 516 64 1343
3
33009
Taiwan 000 108 000 000 000 8 10833 901 10 19 000 1633 25 6141 19678
Vietnam 000 1375
6
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 4250 18006
Thailand 000 000 000 000 221 656 000 000 000 18 000 178 71 9077 10221
Philippin
es
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 29 000 51 000 246 326
South
West
Asia
000 6880 000 000 000 1260 1081 000 14 000 1201
6
6771
7
7370 2970
5
126043
India 000 6230 000 000 000 1231 1081 000 14 000 1200
0
6698
1
7365 1594
4
110846
Srilanka 000 000 000 000 000 21 000 000 000 000 000 736 5 1144
4
12206
Pakistan 000 628 000 000 000 2 000 000 000 000 16 000 000 1404 2050
Iran 000 000 000 000 000 6 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 553 559
Bnglades
h
000 22 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 360 382
Australi
a
&Newz.
000 541 000 33250 758 117 64 000 000 000 000 527 1167
3
5727
0
104200
Australia 000 541 000 33250 758 117 64 000 000 000 000 527 923 5613
1
92311
Newzela
nd
000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1075
0
1139 11889
Arab
Gulf
States
000 791 000 60 505 391 1157 000 1099
6
15 6452
16
8246 2721 2422
2
694320
S.Arabia 000 24 000 60 000 158 000 000 1088
5
000 5979
46
56 61 701 609891
G.States 000 729 000 000 80 208 1115 000 111 15 4727
0
7601 2213 1793
5
77277
Yemen 000 38 000 000 425 25 42 000 000 000 000 589 447 5586 7152
S. &
East
Africa
000 773 000 43 77 71 21944 000 26 272 388 2045
4
347 1238
7
56773
S.Africa 000 000 000 43 18 000 21543 000 000 272 388 712 347 6569 29892
Sudan 000 000 000 000 000 26 000 000 000 000 000 1781
1
000 563 18400
91
Djibouti 000 773 000 000 59 39 401 000 26 000 000 1749 000 4360 7452
Kenya 000 000 000 000 000 4 000 000 000 000 000 77 000 817 898
Tanzania 000 000 000 000 000 2 000 000 000 000 000 60 000 69 131
Total 6938 1075
72
1395
84
192792
7
172514 8089
4
447113 7835
6
2004
1
1055
1
8572
18
2706
69
4896
8
1165
382
533372
7
Source:Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
                     Main imported and exported commodities from 1990-1998 in 000 tons
Imports 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
General Cargo 1392 1213 1579 1793 1226 1062 1020 1370 1165
Grains 2848 2307 2441 1718 996 1589 1343 1607 1928
Flour 11 270 33 27 4 24 39 5 7
Sugar 557 316 648 356 356 503 428 193 140
Other bagged cargo 364 228 309 283 231 566 550 279 516
Steel 326 315 459 406 332 474 465 364 447
Cars, Vehicles, Tyres 31 10 32 65 36 38 52 63 81
Mineral oil 274 507 17 7 7 18 18 27 20
Vegetable oil 112 156 233 244 213 283 163 272 173
Ammonia & Sulphur 249 226 275 354 523 520 534 598 857
Total 6164 5548 6022 5253 3924 5077 4612 4778 5334
Exports
Phosphate 4874 4246 4246 3556 3825 3878 4350 4367 3729
Chemical fertilisers 668 663 549 412 518 637 674 724 1068
General cargo 91 119 139 102 108 151 188 182 389
Re-exports 43 17 27 26 33 31 38 57 46
Transhipment 5 000 1 1 1 8 72 92 16
Transit 349 37 39 28 41 46 47 77 64
Empty containers 82 62 102 100 105 97 113 125 157
Potash 1394 1265 1235 1452 1501 1722 1698 1447 1508
Cement 1366 1268 1006 695 516 109 216 464 333
Total 8872 7677 7362 6381 6648 6679 7396 7535 7310
Source: Aqaba Port Statistics Sheet 1998
